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Abstract 
This thesis is focused on the Self/Other nexus in Russia’s European discourse. The narrative 
of Russia as “a part of the European family” has not been seriously challenged in Russian 
political discourse since the late 1980s, when the idea of the “Common European Home” was 
introduced and espoused. Ever since, Russian leaders have been referring to Russia’s 
historical and cultural affinities with the European milieu and its alleged congruity with 
European political logic. Russia’s self-distancing from Europe has become evident with the 
conservative and civilizational turn that solidified itself in Russian political discourse circa 
2011-2012.  
This thesis seeks to find out how the Self/Other nexus in Russia’s official political discourse 
on EU-Russia relations is being constructed. The analysis is structured along several 
questions: by what means and to what end the EU and Russia recourse to Othering; how 
many strategies of Othering are possible; whether it is possible to deal with the ideas of 
“sameness” and “otherness” without falling into negative dynamics; how certain articulations 
reproduce narratives of Russia’s distinct Self in its European discourse; what kind of 
narrative appears to replace the narrative of Russia’s alleged belongingness to the European 
milieu.  
The study is based on combination of constructivist and poststructuralist premises. Russia 
and the EU are approached from the point of view of their conflictual intersubjectivity, which 
refers to EU-Russia relations as interactions of two ontologically dislocated and unfixed 
subjects dependent on the figure of a symbolic Other. Discourses are approached as not only 
products of actions, but as actions themselves or as least shaping which actions are within the 
possible.
Keywords: international relations, intersubjectivity, discourse analysis, Othering, Russia, 
European Union, foreign policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 This thesis is focused on the analysis of the Self/Other nexus in Russia’s European 
discourse. Political identities do not appear to exist without the distinction between the Self 
and the external actors (the Others). Therefore, any relevant political identification of Russia 
is possible only through its semantic relatedness with Europe, its neighbor and one the 
Kremlin’s most important yet intricate political and economic partners. The narrative of 
Russia as “a part of the European family” has not been seriously challenged in Russian 
political discourse since the late 1980s, when the idea of the “Common European Home”  1
was introduced and espoused. Ever since, Russian leaders have been referring to Russian 
historical and cultural affinities with the European milieu and its alleged congruity with 
European political logic. Since 2000, when Vladimir Putin was elected to his first term as 
President of Russia, Moscow has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy. It focused on 
establishing strong alliance-type relations with the Western countries and on further 
integration with the European Union as part of what was called the “European choice” of 
Russia.  However, the relations between Russia and the EU followed the up and down pattern 2
for about ten years. Already by the middle of the first decade of the 2000s, the Kremlin had 
given up on joining the Western orbit and embarked upon creating its own Moscow-centered 
system. Nevertheless, Russia was still quite far from reformulating its subjectivity as un-
European or even counter-European. Ultimately, Russia’s self-distancing from Europe has 
become evident with the conservative and civilizational turn that solidified itself in Russian 
political discourse circa 2011-2012. Ever since, it has evolved into the cornerstone of 
Moscow’s official political philosophy, and a number of new Russian discourses and 
narratives have emerged. Conservatism and exceptionalism at the basis of Russia’s domestic 
and foreign policy have largely counter-distinguished Russia from its previously advocated 
belongingness to the European milieu, what makes discerning of new Russian narratives of 
paramount importance for understanding the complexities in EU-Russia relations. 
 Gorbachev, Mikhail. “Address given by Mikhail Gorbachev to the Council of Europe.” Speech, 1
Strasbourg,  July 6, 1989. CVCE. Accessed February 21, 2017 <http://www.cvce.eu/content/
publication/2002/9/20/4c021687-98f9-4727-9e8b-836e0bc1f6fb/publishable_en.pdf>
 Trenin, Dmitry. “Vladimir Putin’s Fourth Vector.” Russia in Global Affairs, June 30, 2013. Accessed 2
February 20, 2017 <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Vladimir-Putins-Fourth-Vector---16048/>
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 The processes of Othering in EU-Russia relations have been increasingly studied by 
the academic community since the 1990s. However, previous research was largely confined 
to the evaluation of the Self built around the notion of Europe. Scholarly work in this field 
benefits from the research agenda outlined by Iver B. Neumann, who traces down the 
creation of collective European identity as a result of a series of redefinitions and 
contestations of identities among the array of “non-selves,” where Russia is presented as 
Europe’s constitutive Other (e.g.: Neumann, 1998; Neumann, 1996). The academia develops 
further regarding the question of Othering and its implications for the European identity 
construction by emphasizing the temporal and geographic dimensions (e.g.: Diez, 2005; 
Rumelili, 2004). A recent trend has substantialized itself where researchers attempt to address 
how Russia responses to exclusion by Europe with its own Othering practices (e.g.: 
Kazharski and Makarychev, 2015; Casier, 2013; Trenin, 2013; Sakwa, 2011; Kaempf 2010). 
The growing body of research made by Russian academics tries to identify the most contested 
models of interactions between Russia and the EU (e.g.: Makarychev, 2014; Morozov, 2009) 
and examine them from the position of conflictual intersubjectivity (e.g.: Makarychev and 
Sergunin, 2013). In addition to that, academia proceeds with highlighting the need for 
devising tools for tracing and discerning the processes Othering, where a focus is made on 
discursive approaches (e.g.: Tsygankov, 2007). However, it can be noted that despite quite 
substantial theoretical research on the issue, there is not enough research done regarding the 
empirical applications of Othering in EU-Russia relations against the background of the 
recent deterioration of bilateral relations. 
 In this context, a remarkable deterioration of relations between Russia and the EU 
unleashes the need to take rhetorical action more seriously and look at the official discursive 
praxis more closely. The key issue that is yet to be thoroughly researched lies at the bottom of 
a strong Self/Other dichotomy that has gained force in Russia’s European discourse since 
Russian conservative U-turn. This thesis thus seeks to fill in this gap by conducting an 
analysis of construction of the Self/Other narratives in Russia’s European discourse and 
discerning the main reasons and means of their construction. Before moving to the aim and 
the objectives of this thesis, it is important to note that this research is not intended to engage 
in a full-fledged discussion on Russian identity, which is a different scope of inquiry. Neither 
it seeks to discuss whether Russia can be considered a part of Europe. The proposition here is 
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that the whole array of opinions regarding what Europe is reveals that no single idea 
dominates; there are multiple perceptions of Europe, each being discursively constructed. 
Thereby, within the scope of this thesis, the terms identity/subjectivity and “Europe”/“the 
European Union” are going to be used interchangeably.  
 The aim of this thesis is to find out how the Self/Other nexus in Russia’s official 
political discourse on EU-Russia relations is being constructed.  
 In order to reach the aim of this thesis, the following objectives are set: 
- To identify by what means and to what end the EU and Russia recourse to Othering 
through the concept of conflictual intersubjectivity. 
- To understand how many strategies of Othering are possible; in particular, to understand if 
it is possible to deal with the ideas of “sameness” and “otherness” constructively, without 
falling into the negative dynamics. 
- To devise an ad hoc approach suitable for the analysis of the Self/Other nexus in Russia’s 
European discourse based on the Discourse Analytical Approaches and combination of 
constructivist and poststructuralist premises. 
- To demonstrate how certain articulations reproduce narratives of Russia’s distinct Self in 
its European discourse and to reveal and juxtapose the principal dichotomies within these 
narratives. 
- To outline a contemporary Russian narrative that appears to replace a previously 
maintained narrative of Russia as a part of the European milieu. 
 The timeframe covers a period from 2011, when conservative and civilizational 
dimensions explicitly emerged in Russian discourses, and the Russian leadership began 
consistently juxtaposing Russia and Europe by virtue of the strong Self/Other nexus, to 
present day dynamics of 2017. The selected timeframe appears suitable for tracing the 
development of the Russian views over a manageable account of time. 
 The thesis employs the methodology of discourse analysis. The discourse analysis 
conducted in this study covers the speeches, statements, interviews, and articles by Russia’s 
key political figures, as well as regular programming sources of Russia’s foreign policy. The 
selection of primary sources corresponds to the following criteria: relevance to the scope of 
the research (the Self/Other nexus in Russia’s European discourse), authorship (key texts by 
principal Russian foreign policy actors), genre, and apparent significance. 
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 The theoretical framework of this study draws upon a combination of constructivist 
and poststructuralist approaches. Therefore, this thesis is built around a number of guiding 
premises. First, it is assumed that structure and actor are mutually constituted, while language 
is understood as constitutive for what is brought into being as social or political. Second, 
regarding the discursive dimension, it is assumed that social reality is formed and articulated 
through discursive processes rather than existing independently. 
 The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 focuses on assumptions on the 
Self/Other nexus in Russia-EU relations as discussed from the point of view of conflictual 
intersubjectivity. It is presumed that the concept of the conflictual intersubjectivity is 
instrumental in grasping the complexities of EU-Russia relations as interactions of two 
ontologically dislocated and unfixed subjects. Intersubjectivity in this case is not only about 
finding common ground on key issues, but generally about drawing lines that separate the 
subjects in communication. It is argued that Russia and the EU are both dependent on the 
symbolic Other. The normative argument is presented as one of the main sources of 
discursive discord between Russia and Europe; it is argued that it goes back to the EU’s 
instrumental use of the selective normative agenda. It is further scrutinized how the way in 
which both actors translate the normative language of communication into practice becomes 
yet another source of tensions between Russia and the EU. Finally, the chapter focuses on 
Othering practices as a tool for constructing and maintaining subjectivities. The 
categorization of representations of the Other is introduced, which is distinct from common 
existing models in terms of being based not solely on polar oppositions but on the more 
nuanced mode of linking with the Self. 
 Chapter 2 provides an outline of the methodological framework used in this study.  As 
the key points reveal in this section, the nature of discourses is rooted in the conflictual 
intersubjectivity, and language and power can be seen mutually constitutive. Hence, a 
discursive position reveals and deconstructs what is often perceived as common-sense and 
axiomatic to the political and social reality. It is argued that power structures may overflow 
the political milieu and conduct to formation of certain privileged narratives. In this context, 
it is stated that discourses are dominated by those in power, and dominant meanings can be 
generated or maintained, as well as challenged by counter-hegemonic practices. The chapter 
proceeds with the point that due to the inherent fluidity and multidimensionality of the Self/
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Other relationship, a combination of discursive, constructivist and post-structuralist 
approaches needs to be employed over a more methodologically narrowing rationalist one, 
which ascribes a pre-given and fixed character to norms, values and identities. Criteria 
regarding selecting data for empirical sections are described, and research design of the thesis 
is presented in the form of a table. 
 Chapter 3 is focused on the analysis of the empirical findings. The findings are 
systemazed and distinguished on the basis of the discovered dichotomies and dominant 
narratives. It is argued that Russian key political figures increasingly juxtaposed Russia and 
the EU on the basis of opposing attributes through the six dichotomizations and 
corresponding narratives; these dichotomizations contributed to the strong mode of Othering 
in EU-Russia relations. In addition, it is argued that while Europe may be still reproduced as 
a part of Russia’s Self, the narrative is still constructed as antagonistic. Through continuously 
emphasizing the divergence points, Russia has moved away from its previous narrative, in 
which Europe was considered as a natural cultural and societal context for Russia. Therefore, 
through emphasis on the six dichotomies a border between Russia and the EU is articulated. 
These dichotomies serve for creating and propagating dominant narratives regarding the 
relationship between Russia’s Self and its European Other; they also serve as an important 
tool for grasping the logic and processes behind certain Russian policy options. Finally, it is 
argued that while Russia’s previous strategy largely consisted of attempts to make the West 
accept Russia’s belongingness to a presumably common European milieu and to admit its 
alleged compatibility with the European political logic, the current idea behind Russia’s 
European discourse is to establish itself as a distinct Self. Finally, the conclusion follows 
where the main findings of the conducted analysis are brought together and several important 
implications for understanding of dynamics in EU-Russia relations are given. 
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CHAPTER 1. RUSSIA AND THE EU IN THE FRAMEWORK OF CONFLICTUAL 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
1.1 Introduction 
 The current state of EU-Russia relationship is characterized by a series of crises 
accompanied by multiple misunderstandings and a sense of mutual disappointment. After the 
Ukrainian deadlock and international condemnation of Russia’s military intervention in Syria, 
Russia-EU relations entered a particularly difficult phase. Nevertheless, the deterioration in 
relations between Russia and the EU had started years before. Against the background of the 
expansion of NATO in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and the Orange revolution 
in Ukraine in 2003-2004, Moscow has become increasingly suspicious of Western influence. 
The war in Georgia of 2008 put a grater strain on the up and down relationship. In 2009, the 
Eastern Partnership project addressed to six countries—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—was perceived by Russia with great suspicion. The Kremlin 
has become increasingly concerned about the EU’s integrationist plans and alleged 
aspirations to create its own sphere of interest in the post-Soviet space, thus depriving Russia 
of its status of the priority partner for some of these countries. A dramatic decline in the 
Russia-EU relations became obvious when Ukraine was about to sign an Association 
Agreement with the EU. In the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis and Russian-backed 
secession of the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine, virtually all co-operation between the EU 
and Russia was suspended. As even such tentative conflictual outline may indicate, there is an 
alleged lack of intersubjectivity between the two actors. However, as it will be argued in this 
chapter, the interpretations of intersubjectivity may be different, and at least one 
interpretation not only can be, but also should be applied in the analysis of the Self/Other 
nexus in EU-Russia relations—the one regarding their conflictual intersubjectivity. That is, 
notwithstanding an obvious conflictual relationship between Russia and the EU, both actors 
should be seen in their similarity. That said, Russia and the EU are seen as in a specific 
mutually constitutive identitarian relationship. This chapter sets out to examine the 
intersubjective nature of the problematic of Othering and self-exclusion articulated through 
Russia’s European discourse. In the first part of this chapter the conceptual departures of the 
intersubjective framework will be outlined, with a focus on the idea of conflictual 
intersubjectivity. The second and the third parts will explain EU-Russia conflictual 
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intersubjectivity from the point of view of normative disconnections and dependence of both 
actors on the symbolic Other, respectively. The chapter will conclude with final remarks on 
conflictual intersubjectivity important for the subsequent sections of this study. 
1.2 The Conceptual Departures of the Intersubjective Framework 
 The obviously conflictual trends in the Russia-EU relationship are immanently 
inscribed in the logic of the intersubjective relationship. In this context, intersubjectivity is 
not only about finding common ground on key issues, but generally about drawing lines that 
separate the subjects in communication. Such interpretation of intersubjectivity involves 
strong bordering effect, and it is the fixation of these discursive borderlines that lies at the 
core of Russia-EU disagreements.  To start with, the idea of conflictual intersubjectivity is 3
strongly linked with the constructivist and poststructuralist background. Intersubjectivity 
understood as mutually constitutive identitarian relationship is rather similar to the idea of 
identitarian interdepedence that has been a major theme in constructivist school of thought on 
IR in general and, more specifically, in theoretical accounts of EU-Russia relations.   4
 However, insights in the process of conflictual intersubjectivity can be utilized not 
only exclusively with an eye on identity-related issues, but also for understanding of an 
ongoing processes of social construction of international spatiality. In EU-Russia relations, 
the territorial dimension of conflicting subjectivities can be exemplified by rivalry over 
attempts to gain influence in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. Conflicting 
subjectivities here refer to defining where the Eastern neighborhood ends and where Russia’s 
alleged “privileged sphere of interest” begins. To a large extent, the EaP was a reaction of the 
EU to the growing Western concerns over Russia’s potentially imperialist aspirations, while 
the Eurasian Union project was initiated by Moscow as a reaction to the EaP initiative. From 
conflictual intersubjectivity point, the key result of this Russia-EU competition for influence 
in the designated regions is mutually reactive or retaliatory character of policies. However, 
the contestation over the specific political space is also linked with the general definition of 
 Kazharski, A., Makarychev, A., “Suturing the Neighborhood? Russia and the EU in Conflictual 3
Intersubjectivity,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 62, No. 6 (2015), pp. 328-339.
 Ibid.4
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political subjectivities themselves. Such relations might be termed micro-structural in 
Wendt’s vocabulary since they unfold within deeper structures of international society.  5
 As noted by Prozorov, the existing lack of strategic intersubjectivity between Russia 
and EU leads to issue and identity conflicts and Russia’s narrative of self-exclusion.  6
However, in spite of all disconnections, conflictual intersubjectivity of EU-Russia 
relationship is obvious. The concept of intersubjectivity can be applied as defining the nature 
of Russia’s relations with Europe. While Russian discourse remains mostly Euro-centric, 
even its negativity, and based on European concepts (but often with infusion of its own 
meanings), the EU’s discourse is not necessarily Russia-centric. Nevertheless, the EU seems 
to employ the “Eurocentric procedure of imposing its own hegemony by means of the 
exclusionary discursive strategy of devaluating the Other.”  In return, Russia has attempted 7
to discursively divide Europe into such segments as “a different Europe” and “non-western 
Europe.” In other words, it has tried to broaden the concept of Europe and make it more 
vague and diffused in order to discursively fit in the European milieu.  
 The concept of intersubjectivity is instrumental in grasping the complexities of 
Russia-EU relations as interactions of two ontologically dislocated and unfixed subjects. In a 
more narrow sense, the notion of intersubjectivity points to common areas where both 
subjects engage with each other. That is to say, the two subjects in the conflictual 
intersubjectivity—Russia and the EU—are not only dependent on each other, but are 
reciprocally involved in shaping each other’s identities. Currently, not only the EU is capable 
of asserting influence over Russia, as in 1990s, but Russia may exert some influence over the 
EU as well. However, due to asymmetries which are intrinsic to relations of the 
intersubjective nature, the EU’s role in shaping Russian identity is stronger than Russia’s role 
for Europe. Moreover, since the very activation of the narrative of Russia as “a part of the 
European family,” Russia has been actively seeking to find its place within the European 
political, security and economic milieu. In doing so, it has reinterpreted the key terms of the 
 Makarychev, Andrey. Russia and the EU in a Multipolar World: Discourses, Identities, Norms. ed. 5
Umland, Andreas. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2014, p. 27.
 Prozorov, Sergei. Understanding Conflict Between Russia and the EU: The Limits of Integration. 6
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 46.
 Butler, J., Laclau E., Žižek S. Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on 7
the Left. Brooklyn: Verso, 2000, p. 231.
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hegemonic discourse (such as democracy, freedom, and human rights) and infused them with 
the meanings corresponding to its needs. Russia questions neither of the key European norms 
but rather seeks to offer an alternative interpretation of them, whereas a challenge that Europe 
is facing is that it has to deal with a set of various visions of its advocated concepts.  From 8
the point of view of conflictual intersubjectivity, such “discursive battles” result in a 
normative argument with the EU. The latter will be a subject for a deeper analysis to be 
carried out in the next section. 
1.3 Sources of Discursive Discord between Russia and the EU 
 This section sets out to explore sources of discursive discords between Russia and the 
EU. The analysis will be built around the notion of the normative argument since it is present 
in the majority of aspects of EU-Russia interaction. First and foremost, it is important to 
define what will be understood by the notion of the normative argument between Russia and 
the EU in this study. A considerable part of IR literature on Russia-EU relations tackles the 
normative argument, which presupposes that tensions between Russia and the EU mainly 
stem from the intrinsically diverging normative agendas or from essentially different nature 
of both actors, whereas the EU supposedly takes on the normative actor role, actively 
diffusing its norms in foreign policy, and Russia acts as either a subject driven by interest-
related considerations of realpolitik or a non-normative actor.  For example, as described by 9
Emerson, EU-Russia relations are characterized by a clash of paradigms, in which the EU 
relies on a society-oriented approach and common rules and values, and Russia pursues 
“manifest Realpolitik objectives.”  The normative basis of the EU is often taken for granted 10
and receives little attention per se; the focus is generally on the second dimension—the EU’s 
intention to diffuse its norms in its foreign policy and, in particular, to pursue Russia to accept 
these norms. However, as was argued by Casier, an approach presenting EU-Russia relations 
 Makarychev, Andrey. Russia and the EU in a Multipolar World: Discourses, Identities, Norms. ed. 8
Umland, Andreas. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2014, p. 29.
 Casier, Tom. “The EU–Russia Strategic Partnership: Challenging the Normative Argument,” 9
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 65, No. 7 (2013), p. 1379.
 Emerson, et al. “Synergies vs. Spheres of Influence in the Pan-European Space.” Report. April 7, 10
2009. Brussels: CEPS.
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in terms of the normative gap has become outdated and “obfuscates the complexity at the 
heart of the relations between them.”   11
 In effect, the normative objectives that had been present throughout the first decade of 
the Russia-EU relations, were gradually sidelined. Starting in 2000 at the Feira European 
Council, a pragmatic approach of “constructive engagement” in EU-Russia relations first 
came into sight , where a partnership was seen as a requirement, rather than a choice based 12
on the shared values and norms. The pragmatic approach was reinforced in 2003, when at the 
St. Petersburg Summit the EU and Russia confirmed their commitment to strengthen strategic 
partnership with a view to creating the Four Common Spaces.  Starting from the Road Maps 13
on the Common Spaces that were agreed at the EU-Russia summit in Moscow in 2005, the 
general focus has clearly shifted away from the normative approach of the 1990s. In 2010, 
the Partnership for Modernization took the trend further. As a result, despite some remnants 
of the EU’s normative agenda referring to the adherence to common values, the normative 
objectives have largely moved to the periphery of the EU’s approach to Russia during the 
first decade of the 2000s.  Nevertheless, it would be overly simplistic to presume that the 14
pragmatic notion of the “constructive engagement” that replaced the normative agenda in the 
EU-Russia bilateral relations has eliminated the factor of tensions between the two actors. 
Quite the contrary, the EU’s strategy shifted to the differentiated normative approach towards 
the post-Soviet countries that has spurred new tensions between Russia and the EU in the 
context of growing competition over the common neighbourhood. As argued by Casier, the 
EU’s current selective normative agenda towards East European countries serves instrumental 
purposes and is increasingly used by the EU as a discursive tool of creating hierarchies 
among its East European neighbors.   15
 Casier, Tom. “The EU–Russia Strategic Partnership: Challenging the Normative Argument,” 11
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 65, No. 7 (2013), p. 1385.
 Timmins, Graham. “Strategic or Pragmatic Partnership? The European Union’s Policy towards 12
Russia since the End of the Cold War,” European Security, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2002), 88; Haukkala, Hiski. 
The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership: The Limits of Post-Sovereignty in International Relations. 
London: Routledge, 2011, pp. 122-125.
 European Union, the. “EU/Russia: The four “common spaces.” Memo. The European Union. 13
N o v e m b e r 2 3 , 2 0 0 4 . A c c e s s e d M a r c h 1 2 , 2 0 1 7 < e u r o p a . e u / r a p i d / p r e s s -
release_MEMO-04-268_en.pdf>
 Casier, 1380.14
 Ibid., 1379.15
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1.3.1 The Differentiated Normative Agenda of the EU  
 The EU maintains a strong normative agenda towards its eastern neighbors and, in 
particular, towards Ukraine, which has eventually become a deadlock in its relations with 
Russia. Under such circumstances, a need to critically analyze the functions that norms fulfil 
in the EU’s current policy towards the post-Soviet space arises, in order to grasp the 
complexity of EU-Russia relations. First, in spite of common assumption that the foreign 
policy is seen to diffuse norms because it is driven by those norms, the reality is that a norm-
promoter is not necessarily norm-driven; nor is a norm-driven actor necessarily promotes 
norms. Thereby, there is no inseparable congruence between norms at the input and output 
stage, which can be exemplified as follows. The EU may actively promote certain norms such 
as market liberalization (as output), for interest-related reasons such as creating new 
investment opportunities and then taking share of the market (at the input level); norm-
promotion can thus be perceived as interest-driven.  Second, following constructivist 16
approach, interests are not given ; something needs to be defined and intersubjectively 17
understood as an interest, whereas the framing of an interest implies values and norms. Such 
problematization of dichotomy between norm/interest, and input/output leads to pose a 
question whether the EU is promoting its norms or rather is promoting its interests. 
Particularly, the EU may diffuse certain norms such as democracy in a seemingly interest-
neutral way. However, if a selective normative approach to a certain country fosters the 
adherence to the EU’s normative agenda, it also creates more favourable opportunities for 
member states to pursue their interests. The policies of the latter are often driven by 
commercial, border management, or energy security interests. In other words, the normative 
approach may be used to include certain states such as Ukraine into a European milieu of 
values, whereas the EU is implicitly presented as the embodiment and the main beneficiary of 
these norms and values. Since Russia is quite logically akin to the EU in terms of pursuing its 
interests in its neighborhood, the EU’s selective normative agenda in Eastem Europe cannot 
be considered by Moscow as a neutral policy. Rather it is one of Russia’s major concerns 
over the EU’s presence in the region. That is to say, the current normative agenda of the EU 
 Ibid., 1385.16
 Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” 17
International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1992), pp. 391-425.
L14
and its actions are understood within a context of the remarkably escalated competition over 
the shared neighborhood.  
1.3.2 The Praxis of Inclusion and Exclusion through the Differentiated 
Normative Agenda 
 As it appears from the argued above, the instrumental use of the EU’s selective 
normative policies can be seen in a way of either including or excluding (Othering) various 
actors. Under this perspective, the relations with those included are seen as a matter of 
course, while the relations with those excluded may appear as based on inevitability. This use 
of the normative praxis can be considered as a more sophisticated or a softer way of Othering 
Russia. As argued by Casier, the EU’s normative agenda is conductive to the creation of new 
hierarchy of identities in its eastern neigborhood—and not so much by antagonistically 
Othering Russia on the basis of its alleged maladjustment or threat, but rather by explicitly 
including certain post-Soviet states in the international framework of “normal states.” The 
EU’s relations with neighbours such as Ukraine have been repeatedly presented as based on 
common normative agendas. At the discursive level, Ukraine is thus presented as the 
“natural” and “more European” partner that shares the key norms and values of the EU. In the 
case of Russia, however, relations are no longer based on common normative agenda, but on 
pragmatic grounds. Relations with Russia are thus presented as “inevitable” rather than 
“naturally” coming from shared fundamental values. It is important to note that there the 
processes of reversal of hierarchies and complex prioritization in Eastern Europe are related 
to the internal division in the EU, in which different member states have different attitudes 
towards Russia and different agendas in various policy fields. The previous hierarchy, in 
which Russia held the top spot, has thus not been completely reversed, but replaced by a 
multifaceted process of differential prioritization. 
 At this stage of the analysis, it seems logical to address the view of Russia as a non-
normative foreign policy actor. Whereas the EU’s foreign policy has been widely assumed to 
have a normative character, and Russia’s foreign policy to be a priori non-normative, the self-
presentation of the latter points at quite the opposite. The most recent principal strategic 
document of Russia’s foreign policy, the 2016 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian 
Federation, as well as previous versions dating to 2013 and 2008, comprise references to 
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certain interests and norms, which include sovereignty, territorial integrity, democracy, “a fair 
and democratic international system,” “the rule of international law,” “equal, partnership 
relations among States,” multilateralism, non-interference, universal democratic values, 
human rights and freedoms, environmental security, and sustainable development.  The 18
aforementioned normative references in the Russian foreign policy have important 
similarities to those of the EU. Where Russia’s position clearly sets itself apart is its 
condemnation of double standards and “attempts to lower the role of a sovereign state as a 
fundamental element of international relations and to divide States into categories with 
different rights and responsibilities.”  Obviously, foreign policy self-presentation may not be 19
necessarily reflected in a de facto foreign policy, but articulations such as “preventing double 
standards, respecting national and historic peculiarities of each State in the process of 
democratic transformations without imposing borrowed value systems on anyone”  should 20
be seen as indicative of Moscow’s concern about the differentiated normative agenda. 
1.3.3 Differences in Translation of Normative Language of Communication 
into Practice 
 Another trouble spot resulting in a discursive discord between Russia and the EU can 
be discerned in the way both actors translate the normative language of communication into 
practice. The EU is mostly inclined to treat norms as intrinsically “non-controversial 
universals that have to be projected externally and accepted by those countries that count on 
European benevolence.”  Gaining recognition as a normative power is one of the most 21
effective tools for reassuring the political subjectivity of the EU; it also has an identity-
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the. “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 18
Federation.” Presidential Executive Office. November 30, 2016. Accessed March 11, 2017 <http://
www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/
2542248>; “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation.” The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Russian Federation. February 12, 2013. Accessed March 11, 2017 <http://www.mid.ru/
en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186>; “The 
Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.” Presidential Executive Office. January 12, 2008. 
Accessed March 11, 2017 <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116>
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2008.19
 Ibid.20
 Makarychev, Andrey. “Communication and Dislocations: Normative Disagreements between 21
Russia and the EU,” in Constructing Identities in Europe, ed. Krumm, R., Medvedev, S., Schröder, H. 
Vol. 66 (2012), pp. 45-63.
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shaping capacity. The power of assessing the conduct of other actors thus becomes 
increasingly important for the EU, even though normativity in this case might come into 
conflict with political pragmatism. As noted by Makarychev, should the EU wish to act 
pragmatically, it might have chosen to refrain from the public assessments of election to the 
State Duma in 2007, but as a normative power the EU could not adopt a neutral attitude and 
stay on the sidelines.  The EU had to come up with a normative appraisal that obviously 22
irritated Moscow. Since the major breakdown of bilateral relations between the two actors 
following the Ukrainian deadlock, the EU’s normative appraisals towards Russia have 
become systematic; in particular, the EU consistently condemned Russia’s involvement in 
Eastern Ukraine , annexation of Crimea and “decision of the Russian authorities to give all 23
inhabitants of Crimea Russian passports,”  and Russia’s role in Syria.   24 25
 Against this backdrop, Russia’s instrumental use of the normative content in its 
discourse can be seen through the prism of the floating signifier concept. Moving closer to 
the language-related issues, there are important terms (e.g.: “democracy,” “sovereignty,” 
“multipolarity”) that are widely used in various discourses despite differences among their 
ascribed meanings. Terms like these can be referred as floating signifiers. Floating signifier is 
a concept developed by Laclau  that basically means that the meanings of certain signifiers 26
are changing depending on the hegemonic discourse within several positions in the discursive 
field. For example, the notion of sovereign democracy has been espoused in Russian 
 Makarychev, Andrey. “Communication and Dislocations: Normative Disagreements between 22
Russia and the EU,” in Constructing Identities in Europe, ed. Krumm, R., Medvedev, S., Schröder, H. 
Vol. 66 (2012), pp. 45-63.
 European Parliament. “Ukraine: MEPs condemn terrorist acts and say sanctions against Russia 23
must stay.” Press release. European Parliament. January 15, 2015. Accessed February 19, 2017 
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situation in Crimea.” Resolution. European Parliament. March 16, 2017. Accessed March 21, 2017 
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discourse due to attempts to challenge “Western” understanding of democracy while 
presenting itself as a part of the democratic/“normal” milieu. Thus, Russia neither questions 
the key European norms nor acts as a norm-producer itself (or a norm-taker) but rather as a 
norm-exploiter. In doing so, it reinterprets the key terms of the hegemonic discourse and 
infuses them with its own meanings corresponding to its needs. Unlike the previous two 
decades, Russia nowadays conveys its own normative messages to its neighbors. Besides, as 
argued by Sakwa, Russia is trying to take up a role of a norm-enforcer and come up with 
normative appraisals of the EU’s application of its norms. 
 Finally, the discussed above issues of the EU’s normative power as ideational 
diffusion beyond its borders, as well as the use of normative praxis as a tool of inclusion and 
exclusion (Othering) of certain states are closely related with the conservative turn in 
Russia’s domestic and foreign policy. It is against this background that the Kremlin launched 
its own normative discourse grounded in its interpretation of social conservatism. The 
conservative reinterpretation and the new type of discourse have counter-distinguished Russia 
from the previously advocated affinity with the European milieu and a strategy of moving 
towards a “Wider Europe.”  
1.4 Othering as a Tool of Construction and Maintenance of Subjectivity 
 As was assumed in the previous sections of this study, the EU’s selective normative 
agenda in Eastem Europe cannot be considered by Russia as a neutral policy; the reason is 
that such normative praxis are conductive to either inclusion of certain actors in the European 
milieu or, on the contrary, to their exclusion (Othering). In a similar logic, the Othering 
quality of a European normative power—as it has the effect of turning certain actors into 
Others—has been problematized by Diez. The EU builds up its identity against images of 
Others in the “outside world” and tends to present Europe as a “civilized island” surrounded 
by a disorderly neighborhood.  Against this background, representations of Europe as a 27
normative power cannot be considered a neutral category, even if inclusion/exclusion 
processes do not constitute a primary objective of the EU. By framing an image of the EU as 
a positive force, third countries are thus excluded as Others with substantially different 
 Diez, Thomas. “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering «Normative Power 27
Europe»,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2005), p. 614.
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identities. In his critique of the EU as a normative power Diez distinguishes between four 
different strategies of Othering,  which firstly entails representing the Other as an existential 28
threat; drawing upon the concept of securitization of the Copenhagen School, Diez argues 
that the Other is discursively represented as an existential threat and thus requires emergency 
action. Secondly, the Other is constructed is inferior to the Self. Thirdly, the other violating 
fundamental principles is not simply inferior, but is considered not respecting the norms and 
values of the Self, which have universal validity. Finally, as the least axiological among the 
four strategies of othering, the Other can be represented as different—without the normative 
judgement that is intrinsic to the rest of the strategies.  
 However, with further development of the analysis in terms of Othering, it is 
necessary to address the more underlying assumptions of the Self/Other dichotomy in the 
EU-Russia relations. An important shift of focus that is closely related to the Self/Other 
relation refers to Barth’s assumption that groups are reproduced through the maintenance of 
the boundaries between them and other groups, who are perceived as Others due to “some 
features (that) are used by the actors as signals and emblems of differences” or due to lack or 
possession of some features.  This way, boundary between the Self and the Other is 29
necessary for formation and articulation of the Self. Following the constructivist approach, 
the boundary should not be approached as a priori given and ascribed a fixed meaning; 
empirical research of social and political practices is the way how the establishment and 
maintenance of these boundaries should be analyzed.   30
 The criticality of antagonism to construction, articulation, and reproduction of 
identities can be explained through the prism of the universal and the particular.  According to 
Laclau, the very condition of the politics of difference is precisely the appeal to universal 
principles, while each identity seeks to represent universal in its articulation.  Identity is 31
articulated through establishing as universal and thus, on the one hand, disclaiming itself as a 
 Diez, 628.28
 Barth, Frederik. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. IL, 29
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particularity, but claiming its differential identity, on the other hand. That is, identity is 
concomitantly articulated through a difference with other identities and as representing the 
universal. By the same token, identities are articulated not only as different from the Others, 
but on the grounds of the exclusion or subordination of the Others. The latter causes identities 
to engage into competition in order to establish their particularity as a universal 
representation through antagonistic exclusion of other identities. To make a constructivist 
argument,  identities are dependent on the Other, and relation of the Self to the Other is thus 
necessary to define a particular identity. In addition, identities are promoted and articulated 
through interactions with the Others, and identities maintain certain understanding of the 
world. 
  
1.4.1 Categorizing Representations of the Other 
 As aforesaid, identity can only exist in relation to those that it is not. As Rumelili put 
it, identities are always “constituted in relation to difference because a thing can only be 
known in relation to what it is not.”  Political identities, therefore, appear to exist in the 32
context of the boundary between the Self and the Other. Political identities of the Self and the 
Other do not merely come into existence but are defined due to the perceptions other actors 
have of them. Consequently, they are constructed through a process of socialization—the 
practice of knowing.  However, whilst accepting these assumptions, another important 33
dimension to the Self/Other analysis may be added. First, according to Triandafyllidou, the 
Self/Other nexus “involves both self-awareness of the group and awareness of others from 
which the nation seeks to differentiate itself.”  Hence, it has a dualistic character in the sense 34
that it is both inward-looking (as defining commonality within the group) and outward-
looking (as defining outer groups). Second, the relationship between the Self and the Other is 
liable to change. Lastly, an important aspect of the Self/Other nexus refers to possibility of 
distinguishing between different levels of Othering. As argued by Diez, there are “different 
 Rumelili, Bahar. “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode 32
of Differentiation,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2004), p. 29.
 Neumann, Iver B. Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation. Manchester: 33
Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 12. 
 Triandafyllidou, Anna. “National Identity and the ‘Other’”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 21 No. 4 34
(1998), p. 599.
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kinds of difference: more or less exclusive, antagonistic and violent ones.” The following 
figure represents the four strategies of Othering as argued by Diez : 35
Figure 1: Strategies of Othering (according to Diez) 
 
 
 
 First, in the least axiological manner, the Other is represented as different but neither 
antagonistic nor inferior to the Self. Second, the Other is constructed as inferior to the Self. 
Third, the Other is represented not only as inferior but also as not respecting the norms and 
values of the Self that are considered to have universal validity. Finally, the Other is 
discursively represented as an existential threat requiring emergency action that is the most 
antagonistic way of Othering according to Diez. Taking these propositions as a point of 
departure, it is possible to describe alternative ways of categorizing the Other into 
distinguishable groups. In doing so, the following assumptions will be taken into 
consideration in order to map a more nuanced categorization of representations of the Other. 
First, it refers to Connolly’s assumption that the Self is established not only in relation to a 
series of differences but also in relation to certain similarities (which have become socially 
recognized) . Second, White’s proposition that it is necessary to talk about Othering not as 36
about polar opposites but as about a continuum because the Self and the Other can be 
constructed through different degrees of Othering, raging from a radical difference to a non-
 Diez, Thomas. “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering «Normative Power 35
Europe»,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Vol. 33, No. 3 (2005), p. 628.
 Connolly, William. Identity/Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. 36
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002, p. 144. 
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SELF
Other  
as an Existential Threat
Other as Inferior
Other as Inferior + Violating 
the Universal Norms and 
Values of the Self
Other as Different
radical difference.  Bringing together aforementioned propositions, my assumption here is 37
that it is possible to present the following categorization of representations of the Other: 
Table 1: Categorization of Representations of the Other 
  
 Such model (see Table 1) is distinct from the common existing categorizations as it is 
based not solely on polar oppositions, but on the mode of linking with the Self, which ranges 
within the three categories of the Other. The categorization that is suggested in this thesis 
takes into account not only the delimitating aspect of Othering but also includes possibility of 
a constructive, or non-antagonistic side to Othering processes. In such a way, the first 
category refers to the allied Other, which possesses a strong positive linking and association 
with the Self. The typical characteristics of this type of the Other include recognition of 
historical and cultural affinity, cooperative relationship, and possible existence of a common 
Other, which solidifies the link between the Other and the Self. For example, it is possible to 
argue that the allied Other of the US is the UK. The second category is represented by the 
non-radical Other, which means a mild differentiation, but that of a non-antagonistic and non-
threatening nature; the relationship between the Self and the Other here can be referred as 
looking toward a constructive cooperation. The third category refers to the strongest degree 
OTHER Linking
Radical
Strong differentiation: antagonistic or threatening; 
dichotomies revealing relations of superiority/
inferiority, civilized/uncivilized, rational/irrational, 
good/evil;  relationship based on “inevitability”
Non-radical
Mild differentiation: non-antagonistic and non-
threatening; relationship looking toward a 
constructive cooperation
Allied
Strong linking: identification and association with the 
Self; recognition of historical and cultural affinity; 
cooperative relationship; possible existence of a 
common Other
SELF
 White, S., Feklyunina, V. Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: The 37
Other Europes. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 67.
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of Othering and is represented by the radical Other; the latter is perceived as antagonistic or 
threatening due to the clear dichotomizations in perceptions of the Self and Other; the 
relationship between the Self and the Other is based on “inevitability”. Such categorization 
may be pertinent not only to tracing dynamics of the Self/Other nexus in Russia’s European 
discourse; it also can be used in other particular cases of othering or as applied to a wider 
scope of analysis.  
 Finally, one more important point concerning the extent and dynamics of self-
identification and association with the Other needs to be specified. As argued by Wendt, a 
continuum may very from negative to positive (and vice versa) over time: 
A continuum from negative to positive, that is, from conceiving the Other as 
anathema to the Self to conceiving it as an extension of the Self. Thus, the 
images of the Other might be perceived as a continuum, and a long-
abandoned enemy could conceivably turn into an ally, an extension of the 
Self, over time.   38
 This assumption might be illustrated by example of Germany, France, and Britain in 
the context of the EU. At the same time, as noted by Neumann, it is the radical difference 
towards the Other that plays constitutive role in the formation of the Self.  However, not 39
only enemies but allies can outline the collective Self. As argued by Connolly, the tendency to 
perceive the Other as a completely radically negative entity is rather a temptation than a 
necessity.  Moreover, not only the constitutive Other is not entirely estranged from the Self, 40
but some elements of the Self may be included into its articulation of the Other.  For 41
example, in spite of exclusion of the “Common European Home” narrative from the Russian 
European discourse, Russia still may refer to its historical ties to Europe or common goals in 
fighting terrorism. Thus, due to certain remaining linkages, the EU is not excluded in the 
Russian discourse as entirely alien. Nevertheless, at the same time, the boundary between the 
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two actors has been emphasized as a result of Russia’s conservative turn and new discursive 
practices. Discourses can be seen as based on particular constructions of issues and 
subjectivities, but, simultaneously, these issues and subjectivities get their articulations 
discursively. Put another way, identities are articulated through discourses; the discursive 
approach is thus as a major framework for looking at how certain ideational articulations 
reproduce narrative of Russia’s distinctiveness from its constitutive Other—the EU. 
Conclusions 
 This chapter examined the intersubjective nature of the Russia-EU relationship and 
the trends that are immanently inscribed in its logic. The concept of intersubjectivity is 
instrumental in grasping the complexities of Russia-EU relations as interactions of two 
ontologically dislocated and unfixed subjects. Intersubjectivity in this case is not only about 
finding common ground on key issues, but generally about drawing lines that separate the 
subjects in communication. As it was argued, the space of intersubjectivity may be full of 
disconnections and asymmetries, and the spatiality of the constitution of the two Selves may 
overlap. For instance, attempts to delimit the Selves in spatial terms are reflected in the 
contestation over the common neighborhood. Such interpretation of intersubjectivity involves 
strong bordering effect; the fixation of these discursive borderlines lies at the core of 
disagreements between Russia and the EU. In a more narrow sense, the notion of conflictual 
intersubjectivity refers to common areas where both subjects engage with each other. In this 
context, Russia and the EU are both dependent on the symbolic Other. 
 The second part of this chapter explained Russia and the EU in their conflictual 
intersubjectivity from the position of the normative argument, which is one of the main 
reasons of EU-Russia discursive contrarieties. The normative argument was presented not in 
the context of tensions that stem from the intrinsically diverging normative agendas or from 
drastically different nature of Russia and the EU, but in the light of the EU’s current 
differentiated normative agenda towards post-Soviet space. As was argued by Casier, the 
normative argument has largely moved to the periphery of the EU’s approach to Russia 
during the first decade of the 2000s, and was replaced by the notion of the “constructive 
engagement.” Nevertheless, the factor of tensions between the two actors was not dispelled 
by this shift. On the contrary, the EU’s strategy focused on the selective normative approach 
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towards the post-Soviet countries that has spurred new tensions between Russia and the EU 
in the context of growing competition over the common neighborhood. As was argued by 
Casier, this differentiated normative agenda towards East European countries serves 
instrumental purposes.  
 First, the EU employs the selective normative agenda as a discursive tool of 
prioritizing and creating hierarchies among its East European neighbors, and not so much via 
antagonistically Othering Russia, but rather by explicitly including certain post-Soviet states 
in the European milieu. Such use of the normative praxis can be considered as a more 
sophisticated or a softer way of Othering Russia. For instance, the EU’s relations with its 
Eastern neighbours such as Ukraine have been repeatedly presented as based on common 
normative agendas; at the discursive level, Ukraine is thus presented as the “natural” and 
“more European” partner that shares the key norms and values of the EU. Relations with 
Russia are no longer based on common normative agenda, but on pragmatic grounds and thus 
presented as “inevitable”. This way, the previous hierarchy where Russia was on the top spot, 
has not been completely reversed, but replaced by a multifaceted process of differential 
prioritization. The instrumental use of the EU’s selective normative policies can be seen in a 
way of either including or excluding (Othering) various actors. The relations with those 
included are seen as a matter of course, while the relations with those excluded may appear as 
based on inevitability. Against this background, it was concluded that the EU’s selective 
normative agenda in Eastem Europe cannot be considered by Russia as a neutral policy. 
 Apart from that, it was argued that, in spite of common assumption that the foreign 
policy is seen to diffuse norms because it is driven by those norms, the reality is that a norm-
promoter is not necessarily norm-driven; nor is a norm-driven actor necessarily promotes 
norms. For instance, certain norms such as democracy can be diffused in a seemingly 
interest-neutral way. However, if a selective normative approach to a certain country fosters 
the adherence to the particular normative agenda, it also creates more favourable 
opportunities for a norm-promoter—seen as the embodiment of these values—to pursue its 
interests and become the main beneficiary of a wider adherence to its normative agenda. 
 Another important point, the view of Russia as a non-normative foreign policy actor 
was analyzed. While the EU’s foreign policy has been widely assumed to have a normative 
character, and Russia’s foreign policy to be a priori non-normative, the self-presentation of 
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the latter points at quite the opposite. The latest three versions of the Concept of the Foreign 
Policy of the Russian Federation indicate that normative references articulated in the Russian 
foreign policy have important similarities to those of the EU, while Russia’s position clearly 
sets itself apart is its condemnation of double standards and imposing borrowed value 
systems on anyone.  
 It was further analyzed how the way in which both actors translate the normative 
language of communication into practice becomes yet another source of tensions between 
Russia and Europe. While the EU is generally inclined to treat its norms as non-controversial 
universals that have to be diffused outward, Russia’s instrumental use of the normative 
content can be seen through the prism of the floating signifier concept—a signifier without a 
specific signified. Unlike the previous two decades, Russia now projects its own normative 
discourse grounded in its interpretation of social conservatism. In doing so, Russia has 
reinterpreted some of the key European norms and infused them with the meanings suitable 
to its needs. Besides, Russia is trying to take up a role of a norm-enforcer and come up with 
normative appraisals of the EU’s application of its norms.  
 The third section of this chapter focused at Othering practices as a tool for 
constructing and maintaining subjectivities. Following the Diez’s approach, it was argued that 
it is possible to distinguish between different strategies and multiple levels of Othering. 
Moreover, the boundary between the Self and the Other is necessary for formation and 
articulation of the Self. Following the constructivist approach, this boundary should not be 
approached as a priori given and ascribed a fixed meaning. At the same time, as was argued 
by Laclau, politics of difference is strongly linked with the appeal to universal principles, and 
each identity seeks to represent universal in its articulation. Identity is articulated through 
formulating as universal and thus disclaiming itself as both a particularity and a differential 
identity. Furthermore, subjectivity is articulated not only as distinct but on the grounds of the 
exclusion or subordination of the Others regarding its Self; it causes subjectivities to compete 
over establishing their particularity as a universal representation by antagonistic exclusion of 
other subjectivities.  
 The categorization of representations of the Other was suggested (Table 1) that  is 
distinct from common existing models in terms of being based not solely on polar 
oppositions, but on the more nuanced mode of linking with the Self, ranging within the three 
L26
categories of the Other. Based on the mode of linking with the Self, the categorization 
included three categories of the Other: the allied, non-radical and radical Other. The proposed 
categorization took into account not only the delimitating aspect of Othering but also a 
possibility of the constructive, or non-antagonistic side to Othering processes. 
 Finally, it was argued there is a temporal dimension to the Self/Other continuum, 
which may very from negative to positive (and vice versa) over time, and that some elements 
of the Self may be included into its articulation of the Other. Discourses can be seen as based 
on particular constructions of issues and subjectivities but, at the same times, these issues and 
subjectivities get their articulations discursively; the discursive approach is thus as a major 
framework for looking at how particular articulations constitute narrative of Russia’s 
distinctiveness from its constitutive Other—the EU. 
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CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY 
 This chapter functions as an outline of the methodological framework used in this 
study. First, the essential assumptions of discourse analysis are described. Second, the reasons 
for employing discursive approach are explained in greater detail, as well as its benefits for 
the study. Finally, research design of the empirical sections is presented. 
2.1 The Assumptions of Discourse Analysis in Constructivist and Poststructuralist 
Approaches 
 The theoretical framework of this study draws upon a combination of constructivist 
and poststructuralist approaches. Constructivism is defined by its focus on socially 
constructed nature of interests and identities and, therefore, society’s susceptibility to 
change.  Accordingly, the main constructivist assertion is that in social reality nothing is 42
either constant or fixed. As Delanty notes, everything is a result of a process of continuous 
becoming.  This position puts emphasis on a discursive dimension presupposing that social 43
reality is formed and articulated through discursive processes rather than existing 
independently. At the same time, poststructuralism’s discursive dimension is closely linked 
with understanding of language as constitutive for what is brought into being as social or 
political. Thus, it does not seem possible to draw a line between an “objective” reality and its 
language articulations since all the meanings are created and articulated through language 
practices.  Therefore, the research method used in this thesis is discourse analysis as it 44
provides necessary tools for generating an analytic cut into the Self/Other nexus as it is 
articulated in Russia’s European discourse.  
 Discourse Analytical Approaches (DAAs) posit that “objects, subjects, states, living 
beings, and material structures are given meaning and endowed with a particular identity” 
through language.  The aim of DAAs is to reveal the ontological and epistemological 45
 Griffiths, Martin. International Relations Theory for Twenty-First Century. London: Routledge, 42
2012, p. 60.
 Delanty, G., Rumford, C. Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of 43
Europeanization. London: Routledge, 2005, p. 12.
 Hansen, Lene. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. London and New 44
York: Routledge, 2006, p. 132.
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premises that are embedded in language and that allow a statement to be understood as 
rational or interpreted as meaningful.  DAAs investigate whether—in statements or texts—it 46
is possible to disclose regularities in the discussed objects; the subjects are designated as 
actors, and the causal relations are designated as existing between objects and subjects.  47
There is no mainstream definition of discourse analysis even within one particular school of 
thought, but it may be defined as an “approach to the analysis of language that looks at 
patterns of language across texts as well as the social and cultural contexts in which the texts 
occur.”  Accordingly, it is strongly tangled with a view of reality as socially constructed. An 48
external reality is thus seen as a series of interpretations; social reality is not dependent on 
perceptions of it and becomes only accessible via the manner in which it is organized and 
placed into categories.  Through investigation into these categories it is possible to reveal 49
representations which are utilized within particular attempts of imposing a reality and why 
some representations are more successful than others. 
 The essence of DAAs is rooted in the investigation of both spoken and written 
language because the language we employ in description of “reality” endows it with a 
meaning. An important remark should be made here regarding the existing volatility of 
language, which, however, does not preclude a study of it. First, this peculiarity refers to the 
concept of nodal points developed by Laclau and Mouffe. Laclau and Mouffe argued the 
existence  of nodal points which are “privileged signifiers or reference points ... in a 
discourse   that bind together a particular system of meaning or ‘chain of signification’.”  50
Hence, the process of articulation contains the production of nodal points partially fixing 
 Pedersen, Ove K. “Discourse Analysis.” Working paper no 65, 2009. International Center for 46
Business and Politics Copenhagen Business School. Accessed March 21, 2017 <http://
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J. & Stavrakakis, Y., Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 8.
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meaning, which makes a structural reading of language possible.  Secondly, it is possible to 51
distinguish between differential/referential approaches to language. According to Wæver, a 
referential approach is “where words and concepts are names used in order to make reference 
to objects out there in reality.”  A differential understanding of language incorporates a more 52
systemic approach as “…meaning is located in the differences among concepts.”  Therefore, 53
through seeing language as a system of linking and differentiation, elements of stability may 
be identified. 
 The research programme of discourse approach is highlighted in the following three 
assumptions that were put forward by Milliken.  First, discourses function as systems of 54
signification within which meaning occurs via the relationships between objects placed 
within the sign system. The second assumption is that by defining the actors and their 
practices towards the acted upon, discourses identify how some actors and actions are 
engaged (included) while others are excluded. Hence, discourses construct and reproduce 
certain realities that become common-sense. The third assumption is that through discourses 
meanings can become dominant, hegemonic and fixed; simultaneously, their stabilization can 
be challenged due to the overflowing nature of discourses “that opens up space for change, 
discontinuity, and variation.”  Again, the focus on change and continuity emphasizes the 55
intrinsically changing nature of discourses. Drawing upon the Saussurean semiotic theory  56
and concepts of the signifier and the signified, it may be assumed that as meaning resides in 
the signs, manipulation of these signs determines who speaks and about what they speak. 
Therefore, dominant meanings can be generated or maintained. As such, signifiers can be 
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 Doty, Roxanne L. Imperial Encounters. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, 6. Cited 55
in Milliken, Jennifer, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and 
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seen through the prism of Laclau’s concept of floating signifiers. Reiterating the definition 
from the previous sections of this study, floating signifier basically means that the meanings 
of certain signifiers are changing depending on the hegemonic discourse within several 
positions in the discursive field.  This kind of intrinsic instability of meanings has been 57
elaborated by Laclau and Mouffe in the framework of a social antology termed as “absent 
totality.”  Absent totality assumes that a social order is not structurally predetermined but its 58
formation depends on social forces that contingently undertake hegemonic articulatory 
practices.  As put by Laclau and Mouffe, the “dimension of structural undecidability is the 59
very condition of hegemony.”  Hence, the articulatory practices through which a certain 60
social order is established can be referred as “hegemonic practices.” At the same time, every 
hegemonic order is susceptible to change and being challenged by counter-hegemonic 
practices—the ones which seek to disarticulate the existing order and establish an alternative 
form of hegemony. Finally, the patency of the social is also limiting in terms of how much 
each articulatory practice can accomplish the fabric of the social. As such, the condition of 
permanent non-completion concerns the subject itself. Subjectivities are constructed through 
the articulatory practices but not to the extent of full stability. In a closed system, in which 
each meaning is absolutely fixed, hegemonic practices would not be possible whatsoever as 
the articulatory practices are a general field of the emergence of hegemony.  A fully closed 61
system of differences that excludes any floating signifier would not leave space for any 
meaningful articulation; every practice within this system would be dominated by the 
principle of repetition, and there would be nothing to hegemonize.  
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2.2 Implications of Discourse Analysis to Self-OtherRelations 
 As the key points revealed in the previous section, the nature of discourses is rooted in 
the conflictual intersubjectivity, and language and power can be seen mutually constitutive. In 
the words of Mouffe, 
Every order is therefore political and based on some form of exclusion. 
There are always other possibilities that have been repressed and that can be 
reactivated.  62
 The tools of discourse analysis can help reveal these “discursive battlefields.” By 
revealing how social reality is constructed and reconstructed, a discursive approach can trace 
not only the monolithic formulation of a certain subjectivity, but also a conflictual nature of 
competing subjectivities.  As such, discursive reasoning illuminates power structures in the 63
social and political realm. Indeed, in lieu of power being seen as the possession of material 
resources and capacity, here it is “conceived in terms of the political acts of inclusion and 
exclusion that shape social meanings and identities and condition the construction of social 
antagonism and political frontiers.”  Interests are taken as not pre-given, but something that 64
needs to be formulated and illuminated through patterns of discourses. Power structures 
overflowing the political milieu are conductive to formation of certain privileged narratives 
since discourses are dominated in the first place by those in power; the latter are capable of 
imposing meanings and explanations of social reality which ultimately reflects and protects 
their interests. Hence, a discursive position reveals and deconstructs what is often perceived 
as common-sense or somehow “axiomatic” to the political and social reality. 
 Therefore, rather than merely focusing on explanatory agenda, discursive approach 
contributes to a deeper critical understanding  of how certain policies become implemented 65
and others become rejected. Poststructuralist discourse theory posits that there is no pre-given 
essence that is capable of determining and fixing other identities within a permanent and 
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 Diez, Thomas. “Europe as a Discursive Battleground: Discourse Analysis and European Integration 65
Studies,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2001), pp. 5-38. 
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accomplished structure.  Accordingly, discourse analysis is capable of providing insights 66
into how norms, values and identities are subject to change. As this thesis focuses on the 
inherent fluidity and multidimensionality of the Self/Other relationship, a combination of 
discursive, constructivist and post-structuralist approaches is employed over a more 
methodologically narrowing rationalist one. The latter ascribes a pre-given and fixed 
character to norms, values and identities, whereas the approach chosen for this thesis allows 
for a study of the catalysts which construct, and re- and deconstruct them. 
2.3 The Research Design 
 The research logic of this study is based upon the model of research proposed by 
Hansen.  According to Hansen, to produce a complete research design meeting one’s needs, 67
researcher has to make choices regarding three dimensions. First, it is necessary to decide 
upon the number of Selves to be examined. Basically, it means how many subjects will be 
analyzed. This study focuses on the single Self approach; the Self is represented by Russia. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to note that it may not be as “single” as it might be presumed 
since different kinds of Selves can be simultaneously articulated in Russia’s European 
discourse. Second, temporal domain needs to be defined—whether discourse refers to a 
particular event (usually, however, of a milestone or a turning point character), or it is a 
longer historical development. In this thesis, the preference is given to a synchronic analysis; 
the timeframe was chosen from 2011, when new narratives explicitly emerged in Russian 
discourse, and Russian leaders began consistently juxtaposing Russia and Europe by virtue of 
a strong Self/Other nexus. Third, the number of events needs to be chosen, where the term 
“event” has a rather broad understanding—from policy issues and wars to the continual 
debates on certain issues. According to Hansen, analysis of multiple events has an analytical 
advantage in the sense that a comparison across time makes possible identification of patterns 
and developments. Regarding this study, it can be said that approach of analyzing multiple 
events related by issue (representation of Russia’s Self in its European discourse) is chosen. 
 Torfing, Jacob. “Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges,” in Discourse 66
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Following Hansen’s logic, in case of multiple events approach, it is not the very events that 
are crucial for the study, but rather the patterns and developments rooted in their articulations. 
Finally, one more constituent of research design refers to the intertextual models, which 
basically mean what kind of discourse is under analysis.  In this study official discourses are 68
analyzed.  
 Therefore, the research design of this thesis is based upon the discussed above 
premises of analysis. The figure below presents all features that were included in this model 
and outlines the research design of this exact study. 
Figure 2: The Research Design 
 
 
 
2.4 Data Selection Criteria 
 This section deals with the explanation of criteria regarding selecting texts for 
empirical sections, as well as how exactly to proceed with their analysis. To begin with, it is 
necessary to outline the main requirements, according to which the selection of documents 
was proceeded:  
- relevance to the scope of the research; 
- authorship; 
- genre; 
- apparent significance 
 Hansen, Lene. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. London and New 68
York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 66-67.
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SELF-OTHER RELATIONS IN 
RUSSIA’S EUROPEAN DISCOURSE
Number of Selves: 
- Single: Russia (several kinds 
of the Self are possible)
Temporal Perspective: 
- Temporal development 
2011-2017
Intertextual Models: 
- Official discourse
Number of Events: 
- Related by issue—
representation of Russia’s Self  
 Next, each of the aforementioned criteria will be specified. First, the main 
requirement for the document refers to relevance of chosen texts to the focus of this study. 
That is, texts should be pertinent to the Self/Other nexus in Russia’s European discourse. It 
needs to be noted that this dichotomy may emerge in various contexts, may be articulated 
either explicitly or be of implicit nature. The second requirement refers to authorship, which 
means that the document should be qualified as a key text. In other words, it is texts produced 
by subjects who are strongly related to the issue under analysis. From this point of view, the 
study covers the speeches, statements, interviews, and articles by Russia’s President Vladimir 
Putin, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov, and other 
officials; all of them should have formal position to reproduce narratives of the Self/Other 
nexus. It is important to mention that the key texts should stand out as widely accessible. Due 
to this, some documents were analyzed but not included in the final selection of data in order 
to preserve the representativeness of findings. This point refers to such documents as working 
papers, instructions, fact sheets, and rebuttals, which are through webpages of government 
departments but not widely distributed or not being of wide concern for the general public. 
The third requirement touches upon genre of texts. In this case, the main sources are 
speeches, statements, articles, interviews, and Russian foreign policy regular programming 
primary sources. The final requirement refers to the apparent significance of texts, which is 
strongly linked to the first three criteria. 
 Additionally, it should be stated due to coding rather complex phenomena such as 
floating signifiers and implicit meanings, the study largely employs qualitative content 
analysis, defined as “a method for systematically describing the meaning of qualitative data 
by assigning successive parts of the material to the categories of a coding frame.”  69
 There are 47 texts that were included in the final selection of data and served as a 
basis for analysis of the Self/Other nexus in Russia’s European discourse. Analyzed texts are 
either official translations of original documents into English language or translations made 
by the author of this thesis; the latter case refers to data with no official translations available. 
Each text is throughly read focusing on how the key dichotomies—based upon constitutive 
differences and similarities—are being constructed and articulated in Russia’s narratives 
 Schreier, Margrit. “Qualitative Content Analysis” in The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data 69
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regarding the relationship between its “Self” and the European “Other.” The dominant 
narratives and language tools utilized for their construction are analyzed. Special focus is on 
Russia’s shift from the narrative of being “a part of the European family,” which has not been 
seriously challenged in Russian political discourse since the late 1980s, to the narrative of 
voluntary counter-distinguishing itself from the European milieu, to which Russia previously 
aspired to belong. The findings are systemazed and distinguished on the basis of the 
discovered dichotomies. 
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CHAPTER 3.  RUSSIA’S SELF-OTHER NARRATIVE: ARTICULATIONS 
THROUGH THE SIX DICHOTOMIES 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter is focused on the analysis and the results of the research. The chapter is 
structured along the objectives that were presented in the Introduction of this thesis: 
•  To demonstrate how certain articulations reproduce narratives of Russia’s distinct Self in 
its European discourse and to reveal and juxtapose the principal dichotomies within these 
narratives. 
• To outline a contemporary Russian narrative that appears to replace a previously 
maintained narrative of Russia as a part of the European milieu. 
 The primary sources used in revealing the main narratives and subsequent 
categorization of Othering are listed in Empirical Data section of Literature and Primary 
Sources. It should be noted that the quotes may belong to an individual or a group cited 
within the text but they are not necessarily stated by the author of the source. The primary 
sources can be categorized broadly into six groups. Firstly, the Russian foreign policy regular 
programming primary sources such as Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and 
President’s annual addresses to the Federal Assembly are utilized. As they are widely 
distributed and read, they belong to the key documents conveying particular ideas of Russia’s 
Self to the general public at the domestic level as well as outward. The second group of 
documents is represented by transcripts of conferences and working meetings of key political 
figures. These actors are featured within the echelons of government and hold formal position 
to create and reproduce particular narratives of Russia. The third group takes the form of 
statements on major issues, messages and addresses from political figures and groups. The 
forth group includes press releases, press statements and information notes; answers 
to journalists’ questions following working meetings are also included in this section. The 
fifth and the sixth groups are represented by interviews and articles of Russian principal 
political actors, respectively. 
 As it was previously mentioned, while performing the discourse analysis, mapping of 
the key dichotomies which are used for construction and articulation of the Self/Other nexus 
was done. These dichotomies serve for creating and propagating dominant narratives 
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regarding the relationship between Russia’s “Self” and the European “Other.” Based on these 
dichotomies, it is possible to divide the discourse on the Self/Other nexus from the 
perspective of the Russian leadership into six broad groups as presented in Table 2:  
Table 2: Self/Other Dichotomies in Russia’s European Discourse  
  
 It is argued that through emphasis on the six identified dichotomies the border 
between Russia and the EU is articulated, and a wide scope of contemporary Russian political 
discourses and cultural narratives is built around them. However, it is important to note that 
these dichotomies should not be treated as a subject per se but rather as a tool important for 
grasping the logic and processes behind certain policy options. 
 The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, each of the dichotomies is discussed 
in greater detail so as to provide descriptive explanations of the key Self/Other narratives in 
Russia’s European discourse. The opening of each section provides background information 
leading up to the appearance of a particular narrative. It is necessary to note that it is not 
designed to examine all recent developments in Russian domestic and foreign policy and all 
international developments that affected the relationship between Russia and the EU, but to 
highlight the main actors and the environment within which the narratives are produced. The 
second part of each section provides a qualitative account of the Self/Other dichotomies in 
Russia’s European discourse. After that, the discussed narratives are brought together to 
identify the mode of Othering within the model of categorization presented in Table 1. 
L38
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION THE EUROPEAN UNION
Normative foreign policy actor
Foreign policy actor disregarding 
international norms
Pragmatic and rational Politicizing common issues
Sovereign decision-making capacity Dependence on the external actors
Global power Divided and weak entity
Promoting stability and peace Instigating conflicts
Defending “traditional values” Being in moral decay
SELF OTHER
Finally, the analysis of discourse and background information provide a deeper analytical cut 
and enable a contemporary “Russian narrative” to be formulated. 
3.2 “Normative Foreign Policy Actor” Narrative 
 This section sets out to explore the use of the first dichotomy (Table 2). This type of 
dichotomy refers to Russia as a normative foreign policy actor and the EU as a foreign policy 
actor disregarding international norms. 
3.2.1 Background 
 As argued in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the normative argument has largely moved to 
the periphery of the EU’s approach to Russia during the first decade of the 2000s. It was then 
replaced by the notion of the “constructive engagement” with Moscow and differentiated 
normative agenda towards the post-Soviet countries. However, the EU’s selective normative 
agenda and the EaP policies have spurred new tensions and antagonized Russia and the EU 
over the common neighborhood. Since 2012-2014, the EU has been increasingly accusing 
Russia of violation of human rights, freedom of expression, international law, treaties, and 
borders. In the aftermath of Russia’s involvement in eastern Ukraine and incorporation of 
Crimea the normative argument in the EU-Russia relationship has been reiterated. Counter to 
being widely referred as a non-normative or a realpolitik foreign policy actor, Russia has 
launched its own normative agenda projected outward, in which it presented itself as 
conducting an ethical and norms-based foreign policy while referring to the EU as 
disregarding international norms, resorting to double standards and dividing states into 
categories. 
3.2.2 Discourse of Russian Key Political Figures on the Issue 
 As it was mentioned above, the discourse of Russian key political figures and groups 
on the normative agenda of Russia and the EU largely described the latter as disregarding 
international norms, while Russia was portrayed as an international actor whose foreign 
policy is based on legal norms and contributes to unity. Before moving to the analysis, it 
should be mentioned that references might not be explicitly made to the EU but context made 
it clear that the EU was either particularly addressed or was one of  the addressees. 
 It is reasonable to start from analysis of the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the 
Russian Federation since it is a strategic document of Russia’s foreign policy that gives an 
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explanation of Russia’s self-representation and its perceptions of other international actors. 
Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept comprises references to certain interests and norms, which 
include sovereignty, territorial integrity, democracy, “a fair and democratic international 
system,” “the rule of international law,” “equal, partnership relations among States,” 
multilateralism, non-interference, universal democratic values, human rights and freedoms, 
environmental security, and sustainable development.  Such normative references of the 70
Russian foreign policy are indicative of important similarities to those of the EU. Where 
Russia’s position clearly sets itself apart is its condemnation of double standards and 
imposing borrowed values systems on anyone (Western countries are implied): 
[the competition] has been increasingly gaining a civilizational dimension in 
the form of dueling values. Against this backdrop, attempts to impose values 
on others can stoke xenophobia, intolerance and conflict in international 
affairs, leading ultimately to chaos and an uncontrolled situation in 
international relations.  71
 Clearly, the accusations of adherence to double standards “that deal a blow to the 
universal values underlying modern civilization”  and unethical conduct peaked between 72
2012-2016. For example, referring to the debate on the impossibility of Ukraine’s 
membership in the Eurasian Customs Union on the one hand and signing a free-trade 
agreement with the EU on the other hand, Lavrov condemned the EU for resorting to double 
standards:   
Brussels is rather insistently trying to further liberalize trade with Russia <…
>, and nobody is embarrassed by our membership in the Customs Union. It is 
important to avoid double standards, creation of ideological barriers on the 
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way to extending and developing mutually beneficial trade and economic 
links.  73
 In a similar manner, at the 2014 Munich Security Conference Lavrov accused the EU 
of engaging in double standards in its support of the opposition in Ukraine. As Lavrov 
claimed, “Many prominent EU politicians are actually encouraging such actions although 
back home they are quick to severely punish any violations of the law.”  On the contrary, the 74
image of Russia as pursuing a norms-based and ethical foreign policy has been referred 
repeatedly. According to Lavrov, in its foreign policy “Russia stably abides exactly such an 
approach which is based on strict observance of principles and norms of international law.”  75
The normative argument was mostly used to contrast Russia as a powerful international actor 
that contributes to development of legal norms and unity, and the EU as an entity based on 
“personal exclusiveness, use of double standards and the aspiration to find unilateral 
geopolitical outcomes from crisis situations widely used not only in Europe, but also in other 
regions.”  The following statement made by Putin quite explicitly directs to unilateralism of 76
the EU and its gain-seeking approach towards Russia: 
We have never viewed Europe as a mistress… We have always proposed a 
serious relationship. But now I have the impression that Europe has actually 
been trying to establish material based relations with us, and solely for its 
own gain.  77
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 While the EU’s unilateralism in its relations with Russia is clearly denounced in the 
statement quoted above, the EU’s aspirations to obtain unilateral geopolitical outcomes are 
even more explicitly condemned in the following statement: 
Because it is all right when integration takes place in Europe, but if we do the 
same in the territory of the former Soviet Union, they try to explain it 
by Russia’s desire to restore an empire. I don’t understand the reasons 
for such an approach.  78
 In regard to the statement quoted above, it is also important to note that appeals to the 
actions of the EU (particularly, its activity in the field of European integration) are aimed at 
explaining Russia’s incentives and justifying its own actions. A similar logic of ethical and 
normative equivalency can be traced when Russia refers to similarity between the precedent 
of Kosovo’s secession from Serbia in 2008 and secession of the Crimean peninsula from 
Ukraine in 2014. According to Putin, Kosovo was a precedent “western colleagues created 
with their own hands in a very similar situation.”  That said, the European policies are again 79
depicted through a lens of strong emphasis on its engagement in double standards. Disregard 
for international norms and selective approach towards international legal principles were 
emphasized by Lavrov at the 2015 Munich Security Conference: “If you want to talk, then 
let’s sit down and reaffirm all of the Helsinki principles and see why you think they were 
violated in some cases and not in others,”  and further reiterated in his letter to Secretary 80
General of the Council of Europe: 
In the present challenging situation in our continent we consider it important 
for the Council of Europe to carry out its activities without double standards 
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and selective attitudes that undermine its underlying principles and to 
contribute to overcoming lack of mutual trust.  81
 Thereby, Russia’s narrative of normative agenda mainly consisted of juxtaposing 
Russia as conducting an ethical, norms-based foreign policy sticking to international rules, 
and contributing to unity, and the EU as based on personal exclusiveness, disregarding 
international norms, actively resorting to double standards and adhering to selective 
approaches. The aforementioned dichotomizations can be considered indicative of Russia’s 
attempts to establish itself as monitor of the EU’s application of its advocated norms, as well 
as to project its own normative power outward. At the same time, through reinterpreting some 
of the key European values and norms, Russia infused them with the meanings corresponding 
to its needs. For example, what Russia presented as reunification regarding the 2014 
incorporation of Crimea, was perceived by the EU as annexation in legal terms. 
3.3 “Pragmatic and Rational Actor” Narrative 
 The discourse of Russian key political figures and groups has frequently invoked a 
second dichotomy (Table 2). It refers to Russia as a pragmatic and rational actor, while the 
EU is perceived as an irrational actor that unnecessarily politicizes issues. 
3.3.1 Background 
 The Russian authorities repeatedly blamed the Western governments for choosing 
political approaches towards Russia. In particular, Russia’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) that formally took almost twenty years became an important benchmark 
for solidifying the Kremlin’s narrative accusatory of the EU as unnecessarily politicizing 
issues. Despite that the major bilateral negotiations regarding Russia’s accession to the WTO 
were completed in 2004, in 2009 the accession stalled in the light of creation of the Customs 
Union, with Russia and the EU signing a memorandum regarding remaining issues of 
particular concern to the EU in 2010. However, already in 2011 the new tensions rose, and 
the EU demanded protection from transferring the jobs in the car industry to Russia against 
the backdrop of a new Russian decree, according to which foreign car producers building 
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production plants in the country would be given trade preferences in terms of reduced import 
duties for components.  Ultimately, in October 2011 Brussels and Moscow agreed terms for 82
Russia’s eventual accession to the WTO, but the narrative of the EU as politicizing bilateral 
relations explicitly gathered force in Russia’s political discourse. In a similar manner, Russia 
approached the EU’s Third Energy Package of 2011, which was considered as hostile act 
militating Russia’s South Stream pipeline project. Since the deterioration of Russia-EU 
relations in 2012-2014 the Russian leaders have been systematically characterizing Russia as 
a pragmatic and work-oriented actor while the EU has been depicted as politicizing common 
issues. 
3.3.2 Discourse of Russian Key Political Figures on the Issue 
 To start with, the Russian leaders’ discourse frequently made references to the issue of 
politicization of economic and business ties between the EU and Russia. This discourse 
mainly focused on Russia as a pragmatic actor open for cooperation, while the EU was 
presented as politicizing cooperation. According to the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 
Federation, promotion of “pragmatism,” “transparency” and “predictability” are among key 
objectives of Russia’s foreign policy within bilateral and multilateral frameworks. As stated 83
by Putin, during Russia’s accession to the WTO, the Russian authorities “at times during this 
<…> arduous journey <…> wanted to turn [their] backs on the talks and slam the door,” but 
“did not succumb to emotion.”  In a similar manner, in spite of indicating the alleged EU’s 84
“unfair demands” to Russia made within the WTO and the EU’s application of anti-dumping 
procedures, Putin assured that “these are all technical matters,” and “trade continues to grow 
with every year.”  Even against the background of Western economic sanctions imposed on 85
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Russia, Putin kept returning to articulations of Russia as rational, business-minded and open 
for cooperation:  
There are interests in relations between states, and European countries are 
interested in cooperating in economic, political and counterterrorism spheres; 
in cooperating with Russia. We are ready for this work, we are open to it. We 
are not going to shoot out the lip because of these sanctions. We’re just 
waiting, waiting for everyone.  86
 The idiomatic expression “to shoot out the lip” used by Putin in the aforementioned 
statement indicates that Russia did not take offence or shut itself off from the outside world, 
while repetitive constructions such as “we’re just waiting, waiting for everyone” are 
indicative that it is not Russia who is impeding cooperation. Notably, Putin frequently 
resorted to metaphorical articulations such as “we are not wiggling on things [Russian: “не 
виляем хвостом”=do not wag our tail] and do not change our position. <…> We have 
formulated our position on common and agreeable grounds. We do not have to jump around 
like a flea in a bottle”  to indicate that Russia is pragmatic and easy to deal with. A similar 87
picture of Russian pragmatism is presented in the field of energy cooperation, where “Russia 
and the EU are natural partners in the energy sphere,” and Russia is “ready to boost 
cooperation <…> that benefits both sides.”  Moreover, Russia’s foreign policy was also 88
articulated as transparent and rational. For instance, referring to the EaP program that has 
been one of the major sources of tensions between Russia and the EU during the last years, 
Lavrov described Russia’s approach as “sincere, straight from the mouth” and since the outset 
open “for dialogue, transparency and consideration of each other’s interests in relations 
between Russia, the EU and all our neighbours.”  89
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 On the contrary, the EU has been frequently  juxtaposed with a pragmatic Russia and 
characterized as politicizing issues and irrational. In contrast to the narrative of Russia’s 
pragmatism in the field of economic and business cooperation, the EU has been criticized for 
“politicization of economic and business ties,” when Moscow wanted to see a trade area 
between the EU and Eurasian zones.  Remarkably, between 2011-2013, the Russian 90
leadership repeatedly referred to the EU’s politicizing of humanitarian matters: 
We call for reduction of confrontation in inter-state cooperation in the human 
rights field. Politicized decisions on the human rights situation in individual 
countries is not conducive to building constructive dialogue with them.  91
 In a similar manner, it was claimed by Matvienko that human rights have become a 
subject of “unfounded extreme politicization” by the West, which caused rising global 92
tensions. Politicizied approach of the EU towards Russia was also highlighted in the light of 
decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights: “When a real politicization of the 
court’s decisions takes place, we want to be protected from outright politicization.”  Finally, 93
it is worth to mention that the Russian leaders frequently resorted to criticizing Europe for 
being stuck in a Cold War mindset: “Our partners had better think about becoming moral 
leaders in the newly established global relations. But they have been acting and thinking in 
the same old way—a Cold War cliche.”  That is, such articulation of the Western conduct 94
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indicates its irrationality and depicts it as an actor that is driven by cliches and is out of synch 
with reality. 
3.4 “Sovereign Decision-maker” Narrative 
 The third dichotomy (Table 2) remarkably articulated in Russia’s European discourse 
is linked to representation of Russia as an international actor that has a sovereign decision-
making capacity. In contrast, the EU is represented as an actor whose foreign policy almost 
completely dependent on the external actors or even led by them. 
3.4.1 Background 
 Independence and sovereignty were proclaimed one of the key values in the new 
Russian ideological discourse determined by conservative agenda. After 2012-2014 the new 
national identity articulations became strongly interlaced with Russia’s national security 
agenda and foreign policy. The question of identity was securitized during the 2011-2013 
mass protests in Russia and the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. A special emphasis was placed on 
the uniqueness of Russia as an identity-civilization determined by its longer than thousand 
year history as a political entity, vast territories, necessity to protect borders, and the sense of 
being a great power. Such articulation of identity unraveled specific interests and the 
attachment of particular value to independence and sovereignty. From this perspective, on the 
one hand, the narrative of Russia as an independent decision-maker has been reinforced, 
while the EU has been increasingly represented as an actor who needs external backing to 
hold its own on the world stage. The EU has been frequently described as relying on the US 
or even led by the States due to multiple factors such as transatlantic military and trade 
cooperation, influence of the US on the European Commission and lobbyism of American 
companies in the EU. 
3.4.2 Discourse of Russian Key Political Figures on the Issue 
 It reasonable to start discerning the narrative of sovereign/dependent decision-making 
from articulations of Russia’s national identity. The latter, as was mentioned above, attaches a 
significant weight to Russia’s independence and sovereignty. The Russian leaders’ rhetorics 
has consistently emphasized strong relation between Russia’s sovereignty and preservation of 
national identity. In 2013, Putin claimed that “The desire for independence and sovereignty in 
spiritual, ideological and foreign policy spheres is an integral part of our national 
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character.”  A year later, Putin stated that remaining a sovereign nation was critically 95
important for Russia, which was otherwise destined to “dissolve without a trace and lose its 
identity.”  It is thus implied that Russia must be a strong and independent power. In the 96
process of discursive construction of such conception, Russia not only depicts itself as 
possessing the features of a strong and independent decision-maker but gives reversed 
characteristics to its constitutive Other, the EU. In 2014, Putin openly denied Europe’s 
independence by claiming that the “Western partners, led by the United States of America, 
prefer not to be guided by international law but by the rule of the gun”.  A similar 97
articulation of the EU as the “U.S.-led Western alliance”  was made by Lavrov in the same 98
year. Dependence of the EU on the US, alleged absence of its own foreign policy agenda and 
deficiency of decision-making capacity was even more explicitly articulated by Putin in 
2015: 
Europe does not pursue its own foreign policy agenda. In substance, Europe 
totally gave up on it and transferred a part of its sovereignty to NATO, or, 
maybe, one of the most important parts of its sovereignty. <…> In my 
opinion, our European partners should not sign away their sovereignty and 
should at least take part in decision-making process, not just snap salutes to 
directives coming from across the ocean.  99
 As it follows from the statement quoted above, Russia negatively depicts Europe as 
excessively reliant on the Euro-Atlantic partnership and, therefore, constructs a 
dichotomization between its own sovereign decision-making and the EU’s dependence on the 
US. However, Russia usually perceives the EU as a more convenient partner than the US, and 
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Russian leaders thus often developed an idea that Europe “may become a pole in the new 
international system only through the development of its partnership with Russia.”  100
3.5 “Global Power” Narrative 
 The fourth type of narrative (Table 2) is closely connected with the previously 
discussed  narrative of sovereignty and independent decision-making. The fifth narrative 
either depicts Russia as an already globally powerful actor, or it is articulative of Russia’s 
aspirations to be perceived as a global power. In a dichotomous manner, the EU is 
represented as a divided and weak construction susceptible to destabilizing inner and outer 
developments. 
3.5.1 Background 
 By contrast to a weak state of the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
since 2000s Russia’s assertiveness in the international arena and desire to reclaim its status as 
a great power have been evolving. Under Putin’s third presidency foreign policy of Russia 
has become even more inclined towards realpolitik terms, with the state asserting its interests 
contrary to other great powers. Primary, the rise of Russia as an international actor and desire 
to manifest its strength in its relations with the EU and to be perceived as an equal partner 
provoked a narrative of Russia as the influential center of the modern world. The articulations 
of Russia as an economic, political, energy, and military power gained position in Russia’s 
discourse already by the middle of the first decade of 2000s. After the global financial crisis 
of 2007-2008 Russia repeatedly expressed its readiness to help the EU overcoming the 
financial difficulties through direct assistance. However, the narrative of a strong and reliable 
partner willing to render assistance was soon replaced by a more antagonistic 
characterization. Since the beginning of the EaP initiative and following the profound 
negative developments in the EU-Russia relationship, Russia began consistently juxtaposing 
itself and the EU in terms of a “powerful and united actor” and “a weak and disunited entity” 
dichotomy. The political crisis within the EU and the UK’s withdrawal opened up space for 
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Russia’s narratives of a powerful and consolidated Self, while the EU has been increasingly 
depicted as a profoundly destabilized structure. 
3.5.2 Discourse of Russian Key Political Figures on the Issue 
 Although the focus of this study covers a period from 2011 to 2017, regarding this 
particular narrative it seems reasonable to note that already in 2000 Russia was presented in 
the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation as a “great power, one of the 
most influential centers of the modern world.”  However, the Russian leadership’s discourse 101
on the global power issue may shift across two narratives—the first one depicts Russia as an 
already powerful global actor, while the second narrative presents Russia as a rising global 
actor. The most recent versions of the Concept of the Foreign Policy dating to 2013 and 2016 
pointed at diminishing ability of “the West to dominate world economy and politics” and 
proclaimed that “the global power and development potential <…> is shifting to the East,” 
while “the emergence of new global economic and political actors” led to “eroding the global 
economic and political dominance of the traditional western powers.”  That is, it is 102
presumed that the West and the EU are facing difficulties holding its grounds against both 
Russia and the Asian powers; the Russian leaders connect Russia’s rise as a political power 
and international actor to new balance of powers on the global arena. In a similar manner, in 
the foreign policy part of the 2013 Address to the Federal Assembly Putin stated that Russia 
will strive to be a global leader: 
We do not claim to be any sort of superpower with a claim to global 
or regional hegemony; we do not encroach on anyone’s interests, impose our 
patronage onto anyone, or try to teach others how to live their lives. But we 
will strive to be leaders.  103
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 According to Putin, quest for a leader status “is absolutely objective 
and understandable for a state like Russia, with its great history and culture.”  The 104
articulations of Russia as historical and united power are particularly significant in Russia’s 
European discourse. According to Lavrov, it is clear that “Russia has a special role in 
European and global history” and that Russia for centuries “has been deeply involved in the 
process of political arrangement of Europe, its geopolitical identification.”  Regarding 105
united power articulations, in the 2014 Address to the Federal Assembly Putin claimed that 
firmness of Russia’s foreign policy position on Crimea stems from “the will of millions of our 
people.”  Thereby, the Crimea crisis substantiated the consolidated image of Russia, 106
whereas people of Russia “need to continue and maintain this kind of consolidation.”  107
Besides, Russia has been often described as a military power. For instance, in 2014 Putin 
stated: 
I assure you that we are talking about the most sophisticated arms, such 
offensive and defensive systems that are as yet unavailable to other armies 
of the world. We are yet to cheer up our partners with ideas and their 
implementation—in terms of the systems I have just mentioned.  108
 Moreover, the Russian leaders did not stop characterizing Russia as an economic 
power even after the Russian economy suffered a major setback in 2014 due to low global oil 
prices and sanctions imposed by the West. As claimed by Lavrov, Russia’s economy is 
“standing strong” and “has adapted both to the restrictions [sanctions] and low oil prices” 
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largely by virtue of the successful import substitution program.  Therefore, it is articulated 109
that Russia is able to easily adapt itself to new conditions and develop tools for overcoming 
economic difficulties. Along with that, Russia has been often described as an energy  power. 
Again, even against the backdrop of tightening restrictions on major Russian energy 
companies and oil and gas industry executives, the rhetoric of the Russian leadership 
continues to be indicative of Russia’s energy might: 
If we continue in the same way and without any reduction in intensity, which 
is, frankly speaking, a little bit surprising to me, Russia, without any doubt, 
not only will be able to become, but will become the biggest liquefied natural 
gas producer in the world.  110
 Remarkably, the narrative of Russia as an already powerful or a rising global power 
actor was often opposed to the narrative of a divided or weak EU. On the one hand, Russia 
recognized “the significant role the European Union plays in international affairs,” and 
intended to “maintain intensive and mutually beneficial dialogue with the EU partners on the 
key issues” and create cooperation mechanisms in political and security areas.  However, at 111
the same time, the Russian leadership often referred to the EU as transferring “a part of its 
sovereignty to NATO”  or openly claimed that the EU was “led by the United States of 112
America.”  Moreover, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU strengthened Russian 113
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articulations of Europe as a divided and destabilized construct. As stated by Dvorkovich, the 
withdrawal of the EU weakened the EU and created “uncertainties.”  114
3.6 “Promoter of Stability and Peace” Narrative 
 The fifth narrative (Table 2) depicts Russia as a promoter and guarantor of stability 
and peace. The EU, on the contrary, is articulated as stoking chaos and meddling into other 
states’ affairs. 
3.6.1 Background 
 The EU’s involvement in the common neighborhood and, in particular, the EaP 
project made Russia increasingly suspicious of Western influence and the EU’s attempts to 
find geopolitical outcomes in the post-Soviet states. The Kremlin repeatedly argued Western 
interference, such as supporting the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, the 2004 Orange 
revolution Ukraine, and the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. Russia’s stance on the 2004 
presidential election in Ukraine was clearly articulated as standing upon the third round of 
elections as unconstitutional and orchestrated under the EU pressure.  The 2014 Ukrainian 115
crisis became of grave concern for Moscow; Russia again stressed that the interference of the 
US and the EU in Ukraine was unacceptable. According to the official Kremlin’s position, 
Russia sought to promote stabilization in Ukraine, while the West was destabilizing the 
situation by trying to enforce its will on Ukraine. Russia criticized the pro-Western 
government in Kiev for using force against the rebels and condemned participation of the 
officials from the US and the EU in the Maidan protests. At the same time, the Russian 
leadership denied violation of international law regarding incorporation of Crimea and 
claimed that it was fulfilling Crimea’s right to self-determination. To a large extent, the 
aforementioned circumstances have reinforced the narrative of Russia as a protector and 
promoter of peace and the EU as an instigator of conflicts and actor interfering in affairs of 
other countries. 
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3.6.2 Discourse of Russian Key Political Figures on the Issue 
   First of all, it is necessary to note that throughout the whole period under the study 
the Russian leadership promoted the narrative of Russia as an international actor trying to 
stabilize chaos instigated by the Western countries and, in particular, by the EU during the 
Ukrainian crisis. Remarkably, the Russian leaders’s discourse employing this narrative has 
been marked by rather emotional articulations, involving frequent use of rhetorical questions 
and appeal to common sense. For instance, in 2014 Lavrov asked: “What does incitement of 
increasingly violent street protests have to do with promoting democracy?”  By posing a 116
rhetorical question, Lavrov apparently presumed that the only possible answer is that 
promoting of democracy had nothing to do with encouraging street protests in Ukraine. Along 
with articulations of the EU as stoking violence in Ukraine, the Russian leaders frequently 
invoked the issue of Western meddling into the domestic affairs of other countries, an “itch 
for military intervention,”  and adherence to double standards. In one of the key texts on the 117
issue, Lavrov’s article with a self-explanatory title “It’s not Russia that is destabilising 
Ukraine,” it is explicitly stated that “attempts by those who staged the secession of Kosovo 
from Serbia <…> to question the free will of Crimeans cannot be viewed as anything but a 
flagrant display of double standards.”  In his 2014 speech at a Security Council meeting on 118
global terrorism during the UN General Assembly Lavrov delivered a harsh critique of the 
EU’s handling of conflicts and illegitimately intervening in the internal affairs of its 
neighbors: 
The U.S.-led Western alliance [that] portrays itself as a champion of 
democracy, rule of law and human rights within individual countries, acts 
from directly opposite positions in the international arena, rejecting the 
democratic principle of sovereign equality of states enshrined the UN Charter 
and trying to decide for everyone what is good or evil. (Lavrov 2014)  119
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 As follows from the quote cited above, Lavrov not only referred to the arbitrary 
manner in which the EU intervened in the Ukrainian conflict but once again gave 
characterization of the bloc’s conduct as administered by the US. On the contrary, the Russian 
leaders frequently claimed that Russia tried to do its best to end the conflict in Ukraine. 
According to Putin, while Russia “always respected the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian 
state” and did not want to harm its neighbor anywise, the West caused a civil standoff, 
“sacrificed Ukraine’s unity for their political ambitions” and “did everything to divide 
the nation.”  Additionally, it has been repeatedly highlighted that the EU’s interferences in 120
the inner affairs of other states are “based on the protection of personal exclusiveness <…> 
and the aspiration to find unilateral geopolitical outcomes.”  Inversely, the Russian leaders 121
referred to Crimea’s secession from Ukraine against the backdrop of a plea by Crimea 
and Sevastopol residents to the Russian Federation  to defend “their rights and lives,” which 
Russia “naturally could not leave unheeded.” As claimed by Putin, “abandoning Crimea 
and its residents in distress <…> would have been betrayal on our part.”  The Russian 122
leadership frequently put emphasis on close relations with Ukraine that were notably 
expressed through kinship terms (e.g.: “relations with the fraternal Ukrainian people have 
always been and will remain of foremost importance for us”).  According to Lavrov, it was 123
Russia that “has done more than any other country to support the independent Ukrainian 
state.” In a similar logic of depicting a strong affinity between Russia and Ukraine, Putin 
claimed that Crimea “was and remains a Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean-Tatar land.”  124
Moreover, Russia’s role of promoter of stability in Europe was articulated as historically 
proven: 
We have been an integral part of the European culture and politics for at least 
the last three centuries, and the periods of Russia’s active participation in 
 Putin, Vladimir. “Address by President of the Russian Federation to the State Duma deputies, 120
Federation Council members, heads of Russian regions and civil society representatives 
in the Kremlin.” Speech. Moscow, March 18, 2014. Accessed March 22, 2017 < http://en.kremlin.ru/
events/president/news/20603>
 Lavrov, Sergey. “Speech by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the III Moscow 121
International Security Conference.” Speech. Moscow, May 23, 2014. Accessed March 22, 2017 
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general European affairs were characterised by stability and peace in the 
continent.  125
 Therefore, given such articulations, Russia has been characterized as a promoter of 
stability and a peacemaker, whereas the EU’s line has been reflected as unproductive and 
dangerous. 
3.7 “Defender of Traditional Values” Narrative 
 The sixth narrative (Table 2) emphasizes Russia’s higher moral or traditional values in 
contrast to moral decay of Europe. Defining this narrative more broadly, it may be argued that 
within this interpretation Russia articulates itself as a traditional anti-liberal civilization. What 
is particularly remarkable about this narrative, is that Russia may be articulated either as a 
distinct civilization or a specific, alternative, or, even true (i.e.: the last one who still adheres 
to the “true” European values) European civilization; in the latter case the conceptions of 
Russia as responsible for saving common European cultural and spiritual heritage may be 
implied. 
3.7.1 Background 
 Between 2012-2016 Russian foreign policy and national identity discourse became 
increasingly interconnected. The Russian leadership began to look for a place in the 
international system to a great extent by drawing upon domestic discourses and “big ideas” 
deeply rooted in history and tradition. “Traditional values” have become an integral part of 
Russia’s new social conservatism; its emergence, first of all, has to be understood against the 
background of the volatile pre- and post-election political environment in Russia of 
2011-2012 and Russia’s strong concerns about the EaP project. Moreover, a Western-
influenced and -supported opposition movement in Ukraine that ousted a leader who 
preferred Russia over the EU pushed Moscow against the threat of being not only politically 
encircled abroad but, more than that, “culturally encircled” by Western values. Remarkably, 
2014 was declared the Year of Culture in Russia and “intended to be a year of enlightenment, 
 Lavrov, Sergey. “Speech by the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, at the meeting with 125
members of the Russian International Affairs Council.” Speech. Moscow, June 9, 2014. Accessed 
April 3, 2017 <http://russiancouncil.ru/en/news/sergey-lavrov-meets-riac-members/>
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emphasis on cultural roots, patriotism, values and ethics.”  The Kremlin has directed much 126
effort in constructing and maintaining its vision of “Russian civilization” domestically as 
abroad, and recent pronouncements of the Russian leadership have increasingly invoked 
warnings about the destruction of traditional values. Europe has thus been frequently referred 
as being in moral decay, while Russia has been presented as a moral compass of the world. 
3.7.2 Discourse of Russian Key Political Figures on the Issue 
   As it was mentioned above, this type of narrative is markedly multidimensional and 
is closely interlaced with the civilizational turn in Russia’s political discourse. Remarkably, in 
2000 Putin stated that Russia was, indeed, “part of European culture” and it was impossible 
to imagine Russia “in isolation from Europe and what we often call the civilised world.”  127
This fixation explicitly articulated Europe as a better part of the world that Russia considered 
exemplary and aspired to belong. Nowadays, such articulations vanished from the discourse 
of the Russian political leadership. Quite the opposite, Europe is increasingly presented as 
inferior to high moral values and culture of Russia. In order to understand underlying bases of 
such articulations, it seems reasonable to draw upon a direct quote from Lavrov’s article 
dedicated to historical background of Russia’s Foreign Policy published in 2016:  
Numerous scientific investigations bear witness to the high cultural and 
spiritual level of Rus of those days, a level that was frequently higher than in 
western European states. Many prominent Western thinkers recognized that 
Rus was part of the European context. At the same time, Russian people 
possessed a cultural matrix of their own and an original type of spirituality 
and never merged with the West.  128
 Thus, in spite of stating that Russia was a part of the European context, the 
uniqueness of Russia’s culture and spirituality existing independently from the Western 
influence was emphasized. This implies that Russia is rather a distinct civilization than a part 
of the European civilization. It may be argued that the word choice in the articulation 
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“European context” is quite purposeful and supports this conception by pointing at Russia’s 
involvement in the European developments, but deliberately not ascribing Russia to the 
European civilization. At the same time, mentioning evidence of Russia’s higher “cultural and 
spiritual level” establishes a framework for presenting today’s Russia as moral compass of 
the world—the articulation which became increasingly widespread in Russia’s political 
discourse and contrasted to the moral decay of the EU. Notably, in another article by Lavrov 
dating to 2013 the focus is made on the “fact that we all belong to the European culture, 
European civilization in its broad sense unite Russia and the European Union.”  In this 129
case, Russia is depicted not as a distinct civilization but as a part of the European civilization, 
even if it is specified as in its “broad sense.” Moreover, as claimed by Lavrov, it is a 
“historical achievement” of Russia that “area of distribution of the European culture spreads 
to the coast of the Pacific Ocean.”  Therefore, as follows from the aforementioned 130
examples, at first Russia constructed a narrative within which it may be perceived either as 
distinct or as a specific part of the European civilization. Second, Russia discursively laid the 
groundwork for presenting itself as an actor adhering to traditional values, which can be 
considered not only conservative but true European values. Third, due to such logic Russia 
is able to promote the traditional values not only domestically, but condemn Europe for 
preferring new liberal values over them. This is where the main part of the analysis of this 
narrative begins. 
 Notably, while Europe may be reproduced as a part of Russia’s Self, the relationship 
with the West is constructed as antagonistic. For instance, in 2013 Address to the Federal 
Assembly Putin presented Russia as a defender of conservative values against the Western 
tolerance that leads to equating good and evil: 
Many nations are revising their moral values and ethical norms. <…> 
Society is now required not only to recognise everyone’s right to the freedom 
of consciousness, political views and privacy, but also to accept without 
question the equality of good and evil. This destruction of traditional values 
from above leads to negative consequences for society <…> it is carried out 
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Sergey Lavrov «Russia-France, Russia-Europe: partnership horizons» in a special Russian-French 
edition of the magazine «Russia in Global Affairs».”  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation. March 23, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2017 <http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/rso/-/
asset_publisher/0vP3hQoCPRg5/content/id/108766>  
 Ibid.130
L58
on the basis of abstract, speculative ideas, contrary to the will of the majority, 
which does not accept the changes occurring or the proposed revision 
of values.  131
 While antagonism between higher traditional values of Russia and moral decay of the 
West is explicitly articulated in the statement quoted above, it is highlighted that the 
traditional values are not becoming obsolescent by themselves but are being deliberately 
destructed from above, which adversely affects the majority of society that is still seen as 
sharing traditional morality. Remarkably, there are no specific references to particular 
international actors but it is clear from the context that this is the Western societies that are 
being drawn into moral decay by their governments, while Russia comes up against the 
destruction of traditional values domestically as abroad. The general opposition between the 
West and Russia is articulated in terms of depicting Russia as something better and more 
genuine. In the same year, at the anniversary meeting of the Valdai International Discussion 
Club, Putin presented a more explicit articulation of the Kremlin’s vision of traditional 
values: 
We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually rejecting 
their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western 
civilisation. They are denying moral principles and all traditional identities: 
national, cultural, religious and even sexual. They are implementing policies 
that equate large families with same-sex partnerships, belief in God with the 
belief in Satan.   132
 In spite of several references to moral aspects and what is considered true Western 
values, the axis of the statement cited above is basically constructed around the notion of 
traditional Christian values. Such articulations correspond with the role that once suppressed 
but again encouraged by Putin Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) plays in maintaining 
Russia’s increasingly conservative national identity that heavily depends on “spiritual, 
cultural and national self-determination.”  During the third presidency of Putin, the ROC 133
has not only become a symbol of traditional values but one of the most visible supporters of 
Russian nation-building project. According to Putin, the importance of Orthodoxy 
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“transcends the borders of the present Russian Federation”  and “helps establish relations 134
with peoples of other states, which, above all, refers to the post-Soviet space.”  Therefore, 135
such fixations articulate that traditional values backed by Orthodoxy have the potential for 
integration at least among the post-Soviet states. It is worth to mention the following 
articulation of Russia’s role in defending the traditional values not only at home, but on a 
wider scale: 
Russia here is not opposed to the Western world in terms of values but, on 
the contrary, is presented as a part of its civilization—basically, included in 
internal Western discussions, Russia to a certain extent understands itself as 
an equally legitimate protector of common European spiritual heritage. 
Drawing upon a technical analogy, our state offers itself as a kind of “backup 
server,” “boot CD” with all the key programs (values) in case, when main 
server or computer is attacked by “virus” and it will be needed to restore it in 
its original form. (Kosachev 2013)  136
 Once again, inclusiveness of Russia into Western developments and, therefore, 
reasonability of its aspirations to become a moral compass for Europe is highlighted. At the 
same time, of particular importance is the metaphor through which modern Western liberal 
values are articulated as malware, while Russia is compared with backup server, where 
genuine European values are safely stored awaiting to be invoked. That is, in a temporal 
perspective it is either implied that it is possible to restrict dispersion of non-traditional values 
which are, as it was previously mentioned, seen in Russia’s official discourse as not naturally 
coming from societies’ development but forced from above, or that the Western countries will 
admit their mistake and return to traditional values themselves. Since the latter is unlikely, it 
is understood that Russia feels morally obliged to take on the role of savior of traditional 
values. At the same time, as claimed by Putin, Russia does not “encroach on anyone’s 
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interests, impose patronage onto anyone, or try to teach others how to live their lives”.  In a 137
similar manner, it was stated by Lavrov that the times demanded “integration based on 
different values.”  138
3.8 Bringing the Narratives Together 
 This final section brings together the array of Russia’s Self/Other articulations in its 
European discourse. That is, as a means of summarizing how contemporary Russian narrative 
replaced previously maintained narrative of Russia as a part of the European milieu, this 
section seeks to highlight patterns of convergences and divergencies between the various 
articulations of Russian and European subjectivities.  
 To begin with, arguably, unpreparedness for increased deterioration in bilateral 
relations between Russia and the EU to a great extent relates to the lack of common 
understanding about Russian views on its relations with the bloc. A conducted analysis of the 
six narratives in Russia’s European discourse has been indicative of views of the Russian 
political leaders on Russia-EU relations between 2011 and 2017. At first sight, even the 
recent discourse of the Russian leadership may draw upon optimistic articulations of relations 
between the two actors. However, through closer discerning of rhetorical action, it becomes 
evident that the discourse has been basically constructed around particular dichotomies; such 
dichotomous approach points towards a more confrontational tone. The Russian key political 
figures increasingly juxtaposed Russia and the EU on the basis of opposing attributes. In 
short, Russia has been articulated as a global actor with a pragmatic, norms-based foreign 
policy that promotes stability and peace in its neighborhood as in the wider international 
arena. Besides, Russia has been remarkably characterized as a moral compass for the Western 
world and defender of traditional values. Reversely, the EU has been frequently articulated as 
a divided construct that tends to politicize cooperation and disregards international norms, 
continuously resorting to double standards and thus instigating chaos; the EU’s liberal values 
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have been referred to as destructive and opposing to true European values. Therefore, when a 
border with the EU is constructed, challenging liberal values that are usually associated with 
the West plays important role in it. However, it is important to mention here that while Russia 
explicitly set itself apart from the EU in five out of six identified dichotomies and 
corresponding narratives, the value aspect may be also referred to as a liaison between 
Russian and European subjectivities. That is, through appealing to particular values that 
Russia deems traditional or true European values, it may depict itself as a specific part of the 
European civilization. However, while Europe here is reproduced as a part of Russia’s Self, 
the narrative is still constructed as antagonistic since the Russian leaders criticize European 
states for abandoning their roots and traditional values. 
 Through emphasizing divergence points mentioned above, Russia moves from its 
previous narrative, in which Europe was considered as a natural cultural and societal context 
for Russia, and moves towards further Othering of the EU. Such constructions of subjectivity 
point at Russia’s dependence on its symbolical Other presented by the EU. Drawing upon the 
categorization of representations of the Other that was introduced in the previous sections of 
this study (Table 1), it may be argued that currently the EU represents Russia’s radical Other. 
First, as an analysis of the Self/Other articulations in Russia’s European discourse has shown, 
the mode of differentiation between Russia and the EU is depicted as strong. That is, the 
discourse includes such indicators of radical Othering as exertion of dichotomies revealing 
relations of superiority/inferiority (Russia as a global power / the EU as a divided construct; 
Russia as a sovereign decision-maker / the EU as having transferred a part of its sovereignty 
to NATO); civilized/uncivilized (Russia as having high  moral values / the EU being in moral 
decay; Russia as a norms-based foreign policy actor / the EU as disregarding international 
norms and adhering to double standards); rational/irrational (Russia as business-minded 
and pragmatic / the EU as politicizing common issues); good/evil (Russia as a promoter of 
stability and peace / the EU as an instigator of chaos). Second, as it follows from the 
previous point, the Other is represented as antagonistic and threatening to the Self’s 
subjectivity. Finally, the relationship between the Self and the Other is seen as not naturally 
coming from shared fundamental values but as based on inevitability. It can be identified in 
articulations of the Russian leadership when they refer to necessity of constructive dialogue 
with the EU in spite of different values and opinions. 
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 It should be noted that broad discourse on Russia-EU relations is not limited to the six 
dichotomies and narratives that were presented in this study. Through emphasis on the six 
identified dichotomies a border between Russia and the EU is articulated; they serve for 
creating and propagating dominant narratives regarding the relationship between Russia’s 
Self and its European Other; they also serve as an important tool for grasping the logic and 
processes behind certain policy options. However, a wide scope of contemporary Russian 
political discourses and cultural narratives is also built around them. Thus, while summing up 
the six narratives, it seems reasonable to include several additional articulations in this 
analysis to finalize the study of Self/Other relations in Russia’s European discourse.  
 First, it is worth to mention a series of articulations based on the idea that Russian 
position has been downplayed by other international actors and that it should be perceived at 
the level it deserves. Besides, these articulations may include the idea of being forcefully 
displaced from the “European family” and facing with the unwillingness on the part of the 
West to listen to Russia’s concerns. Second, the civilizational articulations of Russia are 
especially significant. This aspect has been already mentioned in the section discussing the 
narrative of Russia as a defender of traditional values, but some further specifications are 
needed. Today, Russian domestic and foreign policy has become increasingly dependent on 
the ideas of conservatism and Russian exceptionalism, which presuppose the uniqueness of 
Russia as an identity-civilization determined by its history, vast territories, necessity to 
protect borders, and the sense of being a great power. It is assumed that Russia has a special 
civilizational and spiritual mission regarding the neighboring peoples of Eurasia. Moreover, it 
implies that Russia must act as an anchor for all conservative forces that oppose liberal ideas 
and chaos imposed by the Western world. Such articulations point at existence of a greater 
Russian World that transcends state borders of Russia, and of a distinct Russian civilization. 
 Finally, drawing upon the results of the conducted analysis—discerned in a form of 
patterns of convergences and divergencies in various articulations of Russian and European 
subjectivities—it is possible to outline a contemporary Russian narrative that replaced a 
narrative of Russia as a “part of the European family” that was maintained in the discourse of 
the Russian political leadership since the late 1980s. The conservative and civilizational turn 
in the Kremlin’s official discourse that solidified itself during the third presidential term of 
Vladimir Putin to a large extent has influenced framing of Russia’s internal and international 
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priorities. Substantially, conservatism and exceptionalism at the core of Russian domestic and 
foreign policy has largely counter-distinguished Russia from the liberal EU. However, the 
ascending of new narratives in Russia’s European discourse remains overwhelmingly 
Western-centric. That is, the discourse is constructed on the basis of Russia’s semantic 
relatedness with Europe and it frequently appeals to terms borrowed from the West. Most 
importantly, it involves a number of the Self/Other dichotomies. Through continually 
reproducing the articulations of these dichotomies, the key political figures of Russia thus 
contribute to creating of hegemonic discourse on EU-Russia relations. In this discourse 
Russia has been substantially distanced from the previous articulations in which Russia 
aspired to belong to the European milieu and, reversely, has been increasingly presented as a 
distinct system of cultural values or civilization. Remarkably, it is assumed that Russia has 
always been and continues to be involved in shaping the European reality in political, 
economic and cultural dimensions, at the same time preserves its distinct subjectivity. The 
latter is frequently seen as more complex or even more genuine than the European one in 
terms of its moral values. It should be noted that the discourses are not flat and are subject to 
change, and various articulations of the Self/Other relations are thus possible. However, the 
contemporary dominant narrative in Russia’s European discourse is based upon clear 
dichotomizations and strategies of Othering. 
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CONCLUSION 
 The aim of this thesis was to find out how the Self/Other nexus in Russia’s official 
political discourse on EU-Russia relations is being constructed. The questions were raised: by 
what means and to what end the EU and Russia recourse to Othering; how many strategies of 
Othering are possible, and whether it is possible to deal with the ideas of “sameness” and 
“otherness” without falling into negative dynamics; how certain articulations reproduce 
narratives of Russia’s distinct Self in its European discourse, and what kind of narrative 
appears to replace the narrative of Russia’s alleged belongingness to the European milieu. It 
was argued that the Self/Other nexus can be approached from the point of view of conflictual 
intersubjectivity, which presents EU-Russia relations as interactions of two ontologically 
dislocated and unfixed subjects.  
 As this thesis has proven, both Russia and the EU are dependent on the figure of a 
symbolic Other, and the Othering practices are strongly embedded in constructing and 
maintaining political subjectivities. It was argued that the Self is established not only in 
relation to a series of differences but also in relation to certain similarities, and the Self and 
the Other can be constructed through various degrees of Othering. Furthermore, discourses 
can be seen as based on particular constructions of issues and subjectivities, but, 
simultaneously, these issues and subjectivities get their articulations discursively. To put in 
other words, subjectivities are constructed and articulated through discourses. Discourses are 
thus not merely products of actions, but they can be referred to as actions themselves, or at 
least shape which actions are within the possible. 
 As analysis has shown, in contemporary Russia’s European discourse there is a trend 
towards a dichotomous articulation of Russian and European subjectivities. That is, the 
Russian leadership increasingly juxtaposed Russia and the EU on the basis of opposing 
attributes under the whole period of study. The conducted analysis allowed to deduce the six 
dichotomies and corresponding narratives, through which Russia has been increasingly 
distanced from Europe. Firstly, it has been shown that the Russian leaders were resorting to 
the normative argument. The narrative regarding the normative agenda mainly consisted of 
juxtaposing Russia as conducting an ethical, norms-based foreign policy sticking to 
international rules, and contributing to unity, while the EU was depicted as based on personal 
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exclusiveness, disregarding international norms, actively resorting to double standards and 
adhering to selective approaches. Such dichotomizations can be considered indicative of 
Russia’s attempts to establish itself as the monitor of the EU’s application of its advocated 
norms, as well of attempts to project its own normative power outward. Secondly, the 
discourse of Russian key political figures and groups has frequently invoked a dichotomy 
referring to Russia as a pragmatic and work-oriented actor, and the EU as an irrational actor 
unnecessarily politicizing issues. Therefore, the Russian authorities repeatedly blamed the 
Western governments for choosing political approaches towards Russia. The third dichotomy 
invoked representations of Russia as an international actor that has a sovereign decision-
making capacity, while the EU has been referred to as an actor that needs external backing to 
hold its own on the world and thus does not pursue its own foreign policy agenda. From this 
perspective, the Russian leadership frequently blamed the EU for excessively relying on the 
US or even being led by the States due to multiple factors such as transatlantic military and 
trade cooperation, influence of the US on the European Commission and lobbyism of 
American companies in the EU. The fourth narrative that was analyzed either depicted Russia 
as an already globally powerful actor, or was articulative of Russia’s aspirations to be 
perceived as a global power. In a dichotomous manner, the EU was represented as a divided 
and weak construction susceptible to destabilizing inner and outer developments. 
Remarkably, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU strengthened Russian articulations of 
Europe as a divided and destabilized construct. The fifth dichotomy referred to Russia as a 
protector and promoter of peace and stability, while the EU, on the contrary, was articulated 
as stoking chaos and meddling into other states’ affairs. The EU’s line has been reflected as 
unproductive and dangerous especially in the light of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. The final 
sixth narrative emphasized Russia’s higher moral or traditional values in contrast to moral 
decay of Europe. Defining this narrative more broadly, it was argued that within this 
interpretation Russia may articulate itself as a traditional anti-liberal civilization. What is 
particularly remarkable about this narrative, is that Russia may be articulated either as a 
distinct civilization or a specific, alternative, or, even true (i.e.: the last one who still adheres 
to the “true” European values) European civilization, which allegedly empowers Russia to 
present itself as responsible for saving common European cultural and spiritual heritage. 
Therefore, this thesis has demonstrated that Russia has been articulated as a global actor with 
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a pragmatic, norms-based foreign policy that promotes stability and peace in its 
neighborhood as in the wider international arena; Russia has also been remarkably 
characterized as a moral compass for the Western world and defender of traditional values. 
Reversely, the EU has been frequently articulated as a divided construct that tends to 
politicize cooperation and disregards international norms, continuously resorting to double 
standards and thus instigating chaos. The conducted analysis additionally allowed to identify 
factors that, according to the Russian leadership, were conductive to the deterioration of EU-
Russia relations. It was argued that unpreparedness for increased deterioration in bilateral 
relations between Russia and the EU to a great extent relates to the lack of common 
understanding about Russian views on its relations with the bloc, which makes highlighting 
patterns of convergences and divergencies between the various articulations of Russian and 
European subjectivities of special significance. 
 Furthermore, it was argued that through emphasizing divergence points Russia moved 
away from its previous narrative, in which Europe had been considered as a natural cultural 
and societal context for Russia, and moved towards radical Othering of the EU based on the 
strong mode of differentiation. However, while Russia explicitly set itself apart from the EU 
in five out of six identified dichotomies and corresponding narratives, the value aspect could 
be also referred to as a liaison between Russian and European subjectivities. That is, through 
appealing to particular values that Russia deems traditional or true European values, it may 
depict itself as a specific part of the European civilization. However, while Europe here was 
reproduced as a part of Russia’s Self, the narrative was still constructed as antagonistic since 
the Russian leaders criticize European states for abandoning their roots and traditional values. 
 This study has shown that through emphasis on the six dichotomies a border between 
Russia and the EU is articulated; they serve for creating and propagating dominant narratives 
regarding the relationship between Russia’s Self and its European Other; they also serve as an 
important tool for grasping the logic and processes behind certain policy options. 
Furthermore, additional articulations were added in the analysis to finalize the study of Self/
Other relations in Russia’s European discourse. A series of articulations referred to the idea 
that Russian position has been downplayed by other international actors and that it should be 
perceived at the level it deserves. These articulations also included the idea of being excluded 
from the “European family” and facing with the unwillingness on the part of the West to 
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listen to Russia’s concerns. Then, the civilizational articulations of Russia were deemed 
significant and discerned on the basis of Russia’s narrative as a defender of traditional values. 
It was argued that the conservative and civilizational turn in the Kremlin’s official discourse 
solidified itself during the third presidential term of Vladimir Putin and to a large extent 
influenced framing of Russia’s internal and international priorities. Russian domestic and 
foreign policy has thus become increasingly dependent on the concepts of conservatism and 
Russian exceptionalism, while corresponding articulations depicted a greater Russian World, 
transcending state borders of Russia. 
 Finally, based on the results of the conducted analysis, which were discerned in a 
form of patterns of convergences and divergencies in various articulations of Russian and 
European subjectivities, a contemporary Russian narrative that replaced a narrative of Russia 
as a “part of the European family” was outlined in this thesis. It was argued that while 
conservatism and exceptionalism have largely counter-distinguished Russia from the liberal 
EU and presented it as a distinct system of cultural values or civilization, the ascending of 
new narratives in Russia’s discourse remained overwhelmingly Western-centric, which points 
at the dependence on the symbolic Other. At the same time, while Russia’s previous strategy 
largely consisted of attempts to make the West accept Russia’s belongingness to a presumably 
common European milieu and to admit its alleged compatibility with the European political 
logic, the current idea behind Russia’s European discourse is to establish itself as a distinct 
and unique Self challenging the EU’s political subjectivity. 
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